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For the past

American

fifty years,

political tradition

conclude

many of the mores espoused
influence of

the

many

scholarly works written on the subject of the
that the polity in the United States has adopted

thought. This dissertation examines the

in classical liberal

American Exceptionalist thought on American

foreign policy

in the

age of

contemporary “War on Terrorism.” The philosophy of American Exceptionalism has

influenced the planning of foreign policy decisions and as part of the rhetoric used to

explain those

same decisions

contributed to shaping the post-September

and the

rest

The

to the public.

lh
1

l

of the world.

v

Exceptionalist narrative has also

relationship.between the United States
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
America

in the

Following the

h

Immediate Aftermath of the September

terrorist attacks

of September

1

1,

1

l'

2001, George

Attacks'

W. Bush

delivered

formal remarks from the Oval Office. Within his brief statement. Bush attempted to

make sense of the

assaults that occurred earlier that day.

the firm and sure statement that

brightest

“America was targeted

beacon for freedom and opportunity

Nine days

later

in the

Among

Bush’s comments was

for attack

because we’re the

world.”"

Bush presented a formal address to a joint session of Congress and

a nationwide television audience.

During

the burning questions that were surely

in

his forty-minute

the

speech he attempted to answer

minds of many Americans

-

“Who

our country?” and, more specifically, “why do they (the terrorists) hate us?”

second question Bush responded
religion,

1

in

The terms “America” and “American”

known

reference to the theoretical concept

-

our freedom of

Hemisphere.
ethnocentric.

When
I

it

is

used

do not want

at least,

“American Exceptionalism.” Such

more properly

in

synonymous with

the United

of the Western
“America” is parochial and
term “America” in this dissertation

refers to the entirety

the former sense, the term

to repeatedly use the

calling for heightened awareness of both the implications that follow the

use of particular language

permeate

as

are used often in this dissertation, mostly

often too casually used within the U.S. as

is

States of America. “America”

without,

“hate our freedoms

the

our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each

terminology

to

that the terrorists

To

attacked

in

academic works and the often unspoken conceit that seems

political discourse in the

American Exceptionalism,

I

hope

United States. Since this dissertation

that

such arrogance

is

not lost

upon

2

my

is

about

readers.

George W. Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation,”
The Whitehouse, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200 /09/200 1091 1-1 6.html.
1

other."

Almost immediately. Bush's overly simple answers

stemmed from

the

September

1th attacks

1

to the

complex questions

that

were greeted with well-deserved criticism.

4

However, Bush received much more praise than criticism from the mainstream media.

Howard Kurtz of the Washington

Post called Bush's

September 20

,h

speech “rousing”

and “often inspirational.” Kurtz also noted “no pundit on the major networks uttered a
negative comment. They were,

in a

word, wowed.”

Journalists were not the only individuals to

noted public intellectual Stephen E.

George W. Bush, “Address

heap praise upon Bush’s words. The

Ambrose compared Bush

predicted that his words would “resonate with the

5

5

to

Winston Churchill and

American people

to a Joint Session

for a very long

of Congress and the American

People,” The Whitehouse, http://www.whitchousc.gov/ncws/releascs/200 1/09/200 109208.html.
4

See the following sources for a sample of the critique leveled

freedoms” theory:

for a series

countries, see Peter Ford,

September
Hate Us?,"

“Why Do They

Bush’s “our

Hate Us?,” Christian Science Monitor

,

Middle East
Stephen Shalom, “The United States and the Middle East: Why do ‘They’

27, 2001; for a

since 1947, see

at

of interviews with citizens of various Middle Eastern

list

of indictments against U.S. intervention

in the

Z Communications, http://www.zmag.org/znet/viewArticle/18505;

for

another critique of U.S. foreign policy, specifically the relationship between the U.S. and
Israel, see

Kenneth Zapp, “The Naivete of Asking

Minneapolis Star Tribune October
,

5

Howard

Kurtz,

13.

‘Why do They Hate Us So Much’?,”

2001

“Bush Speech Wins

Critics,

Wins

Praise,”

Washington Post

,

September 21, 2001. The title of this piece is rather misleading, since there is little
mention of substantial criticism of Bush's speech in Kurtz’s article. In fact, Kurtz cites a
variety of glowing quotes on Bush’s remarks delivered by well-established members of
the mainstream media.

.

•

time.

»>6

Some
a

comments may have

thought that Bush's

deep chord inside many Americans.

It

is

likely that

lacked complexity, but they struck

temporary feelings of shock, fear

and insecurity led some Americans to agree with Bush simply because he occupied
position of authority.

It

difference conditioned

However,

I

is

a

further possible that discriminatory feelings regarding race and

many Americans

argue that there

is

into accepting the premise of Bush’s argument.

another important reason for the widespread approval of

Bush’s words.

Bush's allusion to “our freedoms” seems

freedoms

that arc present in

American polity
superior to

all

is

set apart

other nations.

many

liberal

to appeal less to the various tangible

democracies than

from the world because

it

The president came very

words of Puritan leader John Winthrop who
be as a Citty vpon a Hill, the eics of

and a by-word through the world

stated that

is

to the

7

(sic).”

Such

“city

close to echoing the often quoted

“wee must Consider

on a

hill”

wee

shall be

that

American

wee

made

language appeals

often seeks to re-affirm, deeply ingrained exceptionalist assumptions shared by

within the

that the

special, unique and normativcly

people arc vppon vs

all

symbolic belief

shall

a story

to,

and

many

polity.

The subject of this

dissertation will be an examination oflhe often alleged

Brent Baker, “Bush Earns

Rave Reviews

for Speech,” Catholic Exchange,

http://catholicexchange.com/2001/09/21/84958.
7

“A Model! of Christian Charity,” in The Puritans: A Sourcebook
Perry Miller & Thomas H. Johnson (Mineola, NY: Dover

John Winthrop,

of Their Writings, ed.

Publications, 2001), 199.

3

existence of an unconscious, yel pervasive, pattern of

the

American

Scholars have often referred

polity.

Exceptionalism.”

common

political thought

to this pattern of thought as

within

“American

8

The focus of this paper

will be to

examine

the influence of

American

Exeeplionalist thought on contemporary U.S. foreign policy decision-making and the use

of American Exceptionalist rhetoric to explain U.S. policy decisions surrounding the

contemporary war on terrorism.

In the

process of developing the above

thesis,

I

will also

discuss the effects of exceptionalist thought on the relationship between the United Stales

and the world since September

To understand

1

1

,

2001

the relationship

employed by George W. Bush,

let

between American Exceptionalism and

the rhetoric

us begin with the examination of the particular word

“freedom.” The following dialogue

is

excerpted from the 1969 movie Easy Rider the
:;

conversation takes places between George Hanson (played by Jack Nicholson) and Billy
(played by Dennis Hopper).

George Hanson: You know, this used to be a helluva good country. can't
understand what's gone wrong with it.
Billy: Man, everybody got chicken, that's what happened. Hey, we can't even get
into like, a second-rate hotel,
mean, a second-rate motel, you dig? They think
we're gonna cut their throat or somethin'. They're scared, man.
I

I

s

Scholars credit Tocqueville with coining the term “America Exceptionalism,”

often pointing to the following quote:

may be

“The position of the Americans

believed that no democratic people

exceptional, and

it

one.” Quoted

Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy

in

(New York: Mentor,
Example

in

1991

),

the International

160.

in

America

,

ed.

at

therefore quite

Richard D. Heffner

In addition, sec Judith Lichtenburg,

Arena” (paper presented

is

will ever be in a similar

“Precedent and

the “Intervention:

Then What?”

Conference, Carleton University. Ottawa, Ontario, October 3-5, 2003), 16. See also,
Michael Kammen, “The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration,”

American Quarterly 45

(

1993): 7.

4

George Hanson: They're

not scared of you. They're seared

of what you represent

to 'em.

Hey. man. All we represent to them, man, is somebody who needs a haircut.
George Hanson: Oh. no. What you represent to them is freedom.
Billy: What the hell is wrong with freedom? That's what it's all about.
George Hanson: Oh. yeah, that's right. That's what's it's all about, all right. But
talkin' about it and bein' it. that's two different things.
mean, it's real hard to be
Billy:

I

free

when you

anybody
maimin’
to you.
it's

are bought and sold in the marketplace.

to

prove

and

gonna scare

Billy: Well,

to

talk to

it

you

American

politics.

Of course,
gel real

don’t ever

busy

tell

killin'

you about individual freedom. But they see a free individual,

'em.

don't

make 'em

George Hanson: No,
This dialogue

that they are.

gonna

and
Oh. yeah, they're gonna talk to you. and talk

that they’re not free, 'cause then they're

it

runnin' scared.

makes 'em dangerous.

illustrates a classic

disconnect between theory and practice in

The concept of freedom

defended by many Americans. At
completely devoid of any

the

y
..

is

extolled and the

same time,

practical denotation.

proclaim to uphold and defend freedom, but

this

Many

concept

word
is

within the

itself is rigorously

an abstraction that

American

their actions indicate that

is

polity

they might not

fully understand the implication of such a statement.

When

a group of individuals, such as

members of

the 1960s counterculture,

attempt to attach a material meaning to the word freedom, they are often vilified by

Americans who consider themselves within
politics.

the idcoloaical

This presents us with a paradox - those

concept into

reality

by giving

it

who

many

mainstream of American

attempt to change freedom from a

a definition (in the case

of the counterculture, defying the

4

Internet Movie Database, “Memorable Quotes for Easy Rider,’' The
Movie Database (IMDb), http://www.imdb.eom/title/tt0064276/quotes.

5

Internet

social,

economic and

political traditions

the hands of individuals

Freedom

is

who

extol the

of their parents' generation) face persecution

word “freedom" hut

an abstraction for the persecutors

in the

at

loath the manifestation of

it.

above example. Rather than

representing a material state of existence with specifically defined liberties for

individuals, “freedom" possesses no specific

ness.”

We

inherently

meaning beyond

its

apparent “American-

can see the development of a circularly logical argument:

American and America

is

the birthplace of

Freedom

is

freedom. This, of course,

tells

us

nothing about either the nature of “freedom" or the American political tradition.

To develop
the

American

rhetoric of

a mature understanding of both

political tradition in general,

freedom as a theoretical concept and

we must move beyond

the often accepted

American Exceptional ism. Exceptionalist rhetoric generally serves

the discussion and often

dissertation,

I

it

also brings reasonable debate to a screeching halt.

will attempt to

add

my

to cloud

In this

voice to an ongoing reasonable debate involving the

discussion over the nature of theoretical constructs such as “freedom" and the proper

place of such constructs

in the larger

American

political tradition.

Outline of the Dissertation

In the

subsequent chapter,

of American Exceptional ism.

I

I

will briefly discuss the intellectual roots

will focus

upon members of the Cold

War

of the theory

Era

“Consensus" School of American Exceptional ism, such as Richard Hofstadter, Daniel
Boorstin and Louis Hartz. The consensus theorists are important because they were the

most ardent adherents
indispensable

if

to the Exceptionalist tradition and, as such,

would become

unwitting influences upon the development of the brand of

6

neoconservalivc thought that

second Bush administration.
In this dissertation,

traditional

I

dominant among the primary decision makers

is

in the

10

am

using the term neoconservative to define a variant upon

conservatism that became noteworthy

in the late

twentieth century.

Neoconservatives often prioritize foreign policy issues above domestic policy;
occasionally “neocons” openly disagree with traditional conservatives on social issues,
but these issues are rarely prioritized in the neoconservative world view.

Neoconservatives have become the primary backers of an aggressive and often
unilateral military policy.

the projection of

In fact, the

prime objective of neoconservatism appears

American military power around

the United States as the unipolar

a significant role in the current

power

in

to be

the globe with the goal of maintaining

the international arena. Neoconservatives play

Bush White House, especially

in

matters of foreign policy

planning and implementation."

Examples of neoconservative thinkers would be Irving

10

Krislol, his son William.

Sources on the Consensus Theorists will include: Daniel

J.

Boorstin. The

Genius of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1953), Louis Hartz, The
Liberal Tradition in America (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991 ), Louis
Hartz, The

Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.

Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the

Men who Made

It

1964),

(New

York: Knopf, 1948).
11

Sources on the association between the George

W. Bush

neoconservatism, see Didier Chaudet, "The Ncoconscrvative

Bush Administration:

Its

Legacy,

Its

Vision,

Its

administration and

Movement

the

End of the

Political Future" (paper presented at the

annual meeting of the International Studies Association, San Francisco,
26. 2008).

at

CA, USA, March

For connections between the consensus theorists and neoconservatives, see

Alan Wolfe, “The Revolution that Never Was,” The

7

New

Republic June
.

7, 1999), 42.

Charles Krauthammer, Charles Murray, Richard Pcrle. Daniel Pipes and Norman
Podhorctz. The elder Kristol founded The Public Interest the
,

what would become known as neoconservative ideas; Kristol

first

is

journal that catered to

considered the founding
T

father of

neoconservatism by

The

many

|

supporters and detractors alike.

third chapter will discuss

more

recent approaches to the study of American

Exceptionalism. There are two contemporary trends that

I

will highlight in

Chapter

Three.

First,

theory of

large

I

will

examine

the evolving thought of a long-standing adherent to the

American Exceptionalism. Seymour Martin

volume of work on

the subject of

relevance of exceptionalist thought

Lipset stands out because of his

American Exceptionalism.

in the

post-Cold

War

Era.

Lipset revisited the

His conclusions will

certainly prove indispensable to a sophisticated understanding of the impact of

Exceptionalism

in the

In his recent

aftermath of September

I

l"'.

works, Lipset noted that while the United Slates moved closer

adopting public controls over economic matters
close to developing a

in the

comprehensive European-style

mid-20th century,

it

social welfare policy.

to

never came

In fact,

Lipset

claimed that European political thought had begun to resemble the American version of
classical liberal political thought

by the end of the 20th century.

contemporary European

movements, such

political

as the “third

Lipset cited

way" centrism supported

“

For a brief overview of the neoconservative philosophy, see Irving Kristol,
“The Neoconservative Persuasion," American Enterprise Institute for Pubic Policy
Research, http://www.aei.org/docLib/20030820_15676Kristolgraphics.pdf.

8

by the

likes of British

1

Schroder as support
If

Prime Minister Tony Blair and German Chaneellor Gerhard

Europeans

arc beginning to act

relationships, does that

“United States clearly
all that,

’

lor his thesis.

make

is

more

no longer

one end of many

Furthermore, Lipset added

Americans

as exceptional politically as

in

Second,

is

I

international indicators of behavior

examine

conservative political theory.
theories by looking

order.

The two

at

will focus,

1989,

15

will

Fukuyama wrote

Seymour Martin

and values.”

an

14

many ways American

on two particularly different conservative

examine

History” thesis and Samuel Huntington and
In

is still

between American Exceptionalism and

the relationship

1

1

It

(y)ct for

15

two of the most notable

theorists that

once was

such distinctions between the U.S. and other nation-states

that

a “double-edged sword.”

will

it

other important ways.

are clearly not always positive; rather, he notes that in

Exceptional ism

in their political

the United States less “exceptional?” Lipsct stated that the

the United States remains exceptional

outlier at

like

interpretations of the post-Cold

arc Francis

his

Fukuyama and

his

War

global

“End of

“Clash of Civilizations” thesis.

his historic essay

“The End of History?” as Soviet

Lipset, “Still the Exceptional Nation?,” Virtu c

Fortuna

1,

http://mai1intanakal.blogspot.com/2007/01/still-exceptional-nation-by-seymour.html

15

will be examining Lipset's recent works, particularly Seymour Martin Lipset,
American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996) and
Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks, It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed
in the United States, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2000).
I

9

Communism was

collapsing

in

predicted that the demise of Soviet

Communism would

mankind's ideological evolution and
the final form of

usher

the universalization

"the end point of

in

of Western liberal democracy as

human government.”

Effectively,

Fukuyama was

of American

articulating a transcendent version

Exccptionalism. For him, the exceptional United States had overwhelmed

enemy
its

and,

in

its

greatest

the process, transformed the ideological structures of the entire globe into

own image and

likeness.

Since the 1992 publication of his theory

tempered

Fukuyama

Eastern Europe. Using Hegelian language,

his perspective.

In the

in full

book form, Fukuyama has

aftermath of the September

lh
I

l

attacks,

Fukuyama

reversed himself on the question of the inevitability of history and furthermore, he

claimed

that the

impact of organizations such as Al-Qaeda compels Westerners to ask

"real questions about the viability of our civilization.”

In

2006, Fukuyama appeared to temper his original thesis even

hitting critique of the neoconservative

promoting the current

Iraq

movement and

War. However,

his thesis, the original declaration of the

those

who chose

1(1

17

to

in spite

the role of the

more with

neo-cons

a hard-

in

of Fukuyama's clear attempt to adjust

"end of history” provides political inspiration for

adopt the messianic style of foreign policy associated with the

Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?,” The National Interest

.

Summer

1989,4.
17

Francis Fukuyama, “Has History Started Again,” Policy, Winter 2002, 3. Also,

Fukuyama, "The End of American Exccptionalism,”
Quarterly, October 200

see Francis

1

10

New

Perspectives

administration of

George W. Bush.

I

s

War

Unlike Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington did not declare the end of the Cold

would

he the end of “history.” Rather, Huntington suggested that serious conflicts

new

remain part of the

global order; the nature of such conflicts, however,

fundamentally cultural instead of political or economic.

to

would be

19

Huntington does not refer to an “American” civilization, specifically; however he
does discuss the distinctive elements of “Western” civilization, as he defines

Aspects

it.

of Western culture highlighted by Huntington, such as “individualism, liberalism,

human

constitutionalism,

(and) the separation of

rights, equality, liberty, rule

of law, democracy, free markets

church and state,” are strikingly similar to the traditionally

“exceptional” traits thought to be

dominant within the American

polity."

Huntington’s theory of civilizations lacks the messianic qualities found

Fukuyama. For Huntington, America will not conquer

all

with the superiority of

However, Huntington does provide us with an important construct

culture.

doubtlessly influenced neoconservative foreign policy practitioners

the globe into separate

1

Francis

and

rival

in

-

its

that

the partitioning of

camps.

Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and
(New Haven: Yale University, 2006).

the

Neoconservative Legacy
19

1

Samuel

P.

Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs,

Summer

993, 22.
2,1

Ibid.,

politically

40.

The

definition of

Western Civilization

is

subjective. Huntington

defined Western Civilization as the nation-states of Western Europe and

and social institutions that were heavily influenced by
Western Europe, including the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.
nation-states with political

Emad

El-Din Aysha concluded that Huntington's thesis,

American Exceptionalism, stressed the existence of and the need
homogeneity" within the subject population

“cultural

21

like the theory

of

for “political unity”

Such core

and

ideals encourage the

adoption of and support for a foreign policy based upon the principle that “(e)ithcr you're

you're against us."

for us or

In the fourth

-2

chapter,

I

will

examine

the influence of

thought on U.S. policy following the September
discourse surrounding the

during the contemporary

American Exceptionalist

lh
1

terrorist attacks.

l

“new normal” standard of American

war on

terror.

I

life

I

will analyze the

on the home

expect to find that current U.S. policy

front

is

presented to the average citizen by appealing to Americans’ sense of themselves as

unique and superior to other nations.

In the fifth

chapter,

I

will

examine

the aftermath of the terrorist attacks

political

the condition of

of September

lh
I

and social position of the United States and

I

its

will consider the

I

.

American Exceptionalism
economic,

citizens. This examination will

reflect

on America domestically and also on the role of the United States within

global

community.

As

a corollary to the

of the United States abroad.

21

Identity:

main argument
I

chapter,

I

the larger

plan to consider the image

anticipate finding that the image of America has been

Emad El-Din Aysha, “Samuel Huntington and the Geopolitics of American
The Function of Foreign Policy in America’s Domestic Clash of Civilizations,”

International Studies Perspectives 4 (2003):
"2

in this

in

1

13.

George W. Bush, “President Unveils Back to Work Plan." The Whitehouse,
/ 0/200
004-8.html.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200

1

1

1

1

tarnished by the sense that the United States

perceived uniqueness

in the

Exceptional ist myth. Included

discuss the potential for

relations

is

focus on a particular

examined. Smith

rights) are not at

all

of social

(e.g., the

by the American

multiple traditions, with warts and

relations.

When

a multitude of social

that there are

multiple political

maintenance of slavery long after

the denial

when compared

Exceptionalisls.

all,

its

of citizenship and voting

to the self-serving

nature of the

However, recognition of these

gives Americans an important sense of agency

political luture."

Smith's “multiple traditions” theory challenges

Exceptionalism

argument

that

in a

most profound way.

America

liberal tradition, then

is

unique and

we can

its

If the

polity

infer that there

the doctrine of

American

Exceptionalisls are correct in their

is

hopelessly enslaved to the classical

is little

hope for the successful

implementation of fundamental policy changes. However,

23

the

American Exceptional ists were too

becomes apparent

valorous, especially

traditions trumpeted

over their

it

that the

remainder of the Western world,

in the

moving beyond

polity."

Several of these traditions

disappearance

set

asserts,

American

traditions within the

its

chapter will be an examination of the contemporary

in that

thought of Rogers Smith. Smith has argued
in their

profoundly arrogant coneerning

world.

My concluding chapter will

narrow

is

if

there

is

evidence that there

Rogers M. Smith, “Beyond Tocqueville. Myrdal and Hartz: The Multiple
in America,” American Political Science Review 87 (1993): 549-550.

Traditions
24

Ibid.,

550.
13

are multiple traditions and these traditions have figured prominently at various historic

moments, then prospects

for fundamental

change are significant and Americans have the

opportunity to re-fashion their polity based upon a different narrative.

In

my

America and

conclusion,

I

I

plan to address Smith’s prescription for a less “exceptional”

will also provide

my own

Exceptionalist United States. Finally,

I

thoughts on the prospects for a post-

will discuss the benefits

narrative, particularly the positive impact that a

the global perception of the United States.

14

new American

of accepting a different

narrative might have

on

CHAPTER

2

THE INTELLECTUAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
Introduction

As noted

in the

previous chapter, cxceptionalist interpretations of the American

However,

experience can be traced back to the Puritans.

it

was

intellectuals during the

Cold War era who attempted to find a modern application for the long-standing belief
that the

American

polity

is

a unique institution in

discuss the major figures that gave birth to the

Exceptionalism and

I

world

In this chapter,

politics.

1

will

modern conception of American

will further explain their influence

upon

the accepted

wisdom

concerning Exceptionalism.

One should

not be surprised to find an explicitly cxceptionalist conception

develop during the 1950s since the political thought of this period was dominated by the

bi-polar global relationship

like

between the United Stales and the Soviet Union. Scholars,

many Americans, were searching

differences between the conflicting

for a

model

that

could explain the comparative

world-views championed by these two dominant

nation-states.

Each olThe

first

three sections of this chapter will briefly

examine

presented by one of the major Exceptionalist thinkers of this time.

the chapter will discuss the

Exceptionalism.

In

major

addition,

I

similarities

among

The

a theory

final section

the various brands of early

will attempt to point out the features

of each theory which

impact the most upon the discussion of the role of the United States in the post-

September

1

1

l"

world.

15

of

Richard Hofstadter and The American Political Tradition

Richard Holsladlcr can reasonably be considered Ihc

As a young man,

theorist.

Hofstadter

was influenced by

first

Cold War Consensus

the materialist analysis of

history advocated by Charles Beard and others during the Progressive Era.

in

the

American Communist

very long.

By

Party before

Marxian approach as

his

leftist political

active

member

for

ideology but

primary tool of historical

25

1948. Hofstadter wrote The American Political Tradition

In

Made

but did not remain a

II,

abandoned

the late 1940s, Hofstadter had

largely maintained a classical

inquiry.

World War

He was

It,

the

first

major post-World

War

work dealing with

II

and

the

Men Who

the question of

American

Exceptionalism. Hofstadter's book was a compilation of twelve biographical portraits of

American

leaders,

mainstream of

some of whom

their time.

initially

appeared to reside outside of the political

Hofstadter concluded that

all

of the

men

profiled in his

held political ideas that were strikingly similar to one another in spite of the

perception that they qualified as ideological outliers from the norm.

The main
his

book

are a

thesis of this

work

microcosm of the

is

book

common

26

Hofstadter’s argument that the leaders featured in

entirety of

American

political thought.

In his

biographical profiles, he attempted repeatedly to demonstrate that the parochial political
differences which surface

"5

David

S.
26

at

given

moments

in

American history were not systemic

Bruce Kuklick, review of Richard Hofstadter:

Brown, Transactions of the Charles

S.

Hofstadter 1948, v-x.
16

An

Intellectual Biography,

Peirce Society, Fall2006, 574-575.

by

were actually minor policy disagreements. Furthermore, Hofstadler asserted

conflicts but

that

such seemingly significant policy disagreements occurred between factions and

who

leaders

ultimately shared a multitude of fundamental assumptions.

The American
conflicts

political scene,

according to Hofstadter, was marked by a "series of

between special interests” rather than between socio-economic

classes.

He

claimed that both professional historians and casual observers of American social history
often miss this point

moments

the past.

in

because they focus upon the ferocity of the conflict

Historians, he believed, placed conflict “in the foreground” while

“commonly shared convictions (were) neglected.
to offer a

2S

Hofstadler’ s project

He reasoned

that the intense

the

book was

fundamental nature of struggle

elites

in

29
.

and sometimes violent moments

were not revolutionary moments. Rather, these dramatic

American

American history

in

moments camouflaged

the

politics; political conflict has often been

over narrow points of divergence within their

"beyond temporary and local conflicts there has been a
cultural

in

counter-argument to the majority of historians who, he believed, wrongly

focused on minor conflicts rather than on the significant consensus

among

various

at

own

common

ranks

30
.

He

ground, a unity of

and political tradition, upon which American civilization has stood .”

"x

Ibid., ix.
J)

Ibid., ix-x.
30

Ibid., viii-ix.
31

Ibid., x.
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stated that

31

Hofstadtcr asserted that major political leaders and the movements

championed over the years displayed strikingly similar core
beliefs

were primarily economic and, furthermore,

assumptions included a rather
the philosophy of

strict

adherence

For him, these core

distinctly capitalistic.

The

shared

to three principles: “the right to property,

economic individualism (and)

Based upon

beliefs.

that they

his observations, Hofstadtcr

the value of competition .”

reasoned that a unique

32

political culture

developed within the United States as a result of the near consensus on fundamental

He claimed

political values.

narrow and limited by the

that the

common

“range of ideas”

assumptions

“dissenters and alienated intellectuals .”

In this

American

were held by

political discourse

all

tradition.

but a small group of

33

isolated individual.

fraternal aspect

all

citizens are often lauded as a fundamental feature of the

However, Hofstadtcr pointed out

important value because

it

From

that

democracy was seen

his observations, he

concluded regrettably

of democracy appeared to be neglected

strictly

as an

provided opportunities for the personal enrichment of

in the

the

that the collective or

American

political scene

For Hofstadtcr, traditional American individualism and the propensity

upon the

was

unique political culture, procedural democracy and the accompanying

equality of opportunity for

American

that

in

procedural aspects of democracy combined to foster a culture

to focus

that has

34
.

been “intensely nationalistic and
that “it has

for the

most

been fiercely individualistic and

part isolationist.”

In

addition, he claimed

15

capitalistic” as well.

Daniel Boorstin and The Genius of American Politics

If

Hofstadter

is

correct that there

thought, the next question should be

thought development

in

is

a clearly rigid consensus in

how and why

American

political

did such uniformity in political

the United States? Daniel Boorstin offered one possible

answer

to this philosophical mystery.

Boorstin was both a legal scholar and a professor of history

Chicago.

Much

young man,

like Hofstadter, Boorstin

but he clearly drifted

ideology by the 1950s.

was

away from

In fact, his

a

at

the University of

proponent of left-wing politics as a

socialist

thought or any other definitive

book The Genius of American

Politics, written in

1953, trumpeted his belief that the American polity lacked a strong political ideology of

any kind. Boorstin wrote Genius early

most overtly

political

and

his

most

in his intellectual career,

but

stands as both his

its

explicitly cxceptionalist statement.

For Boorstin. the foundation of America's philosophic “genius”

is

the unqualified

simplicity of American political thought. He clearly assumed that his consideration of

American

politics as “genius” diverged fundamentally from the standard philosophic

analysis which focused upon a few extraordinary intellectuals

treatises.

Quite the contrary, Boorstin asserted

5

that

American

who wrote memorable
political

thought qualified

academic career, Hofstadter appeared to revise his
cxceptionalist viewpoint. The primary source for his seeming transformation is Richard
Hofstadter, The Progressive Historians (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968).
Ibid., x.

Late

in his

19

as “genius” in spile of

its

lack of both philosophical giants

and an original canon.

Boorslin's assertions lead him into a puzzling paradox that

overcome

in

the course of his book. Early

firm belief that “political

life (in

in

Genius he stated

the United States)

he further asserted that “no nation has ever been

produced

less in the

way

of theory."

For the remainder of the

between the

,

that

attempted to

Americans hold a

was based on a perfect theory;”

less interested in political

yet,

philosophy or

77

text,

intuitive sense that the

lie

Boorstin endeavored to solve the political paradox

American nation was

built

upon the perfect theory

and the general aloofness of most Americans toward the musings of intellectuals and
philosophers. In so doing he claimed to have discovered the source of both the

™

•

uniqueness and the greatness

in

American

political life.

For Boorstin, the source of the American consensus was a phenomenon he called
“givenness.” Boorstin defined

this

concept as the belief

in

values that “are in

some way

or other automatically defined: given by certain facts of geography or history particular to

us.”

He

further asserted that there

inimitable “American

Way

was both

a distinctive

“American

Way of Life”

of Thought.” These exceptional social and cultural

and an

traits

were “given” or born out of the unique material conditions found on the American

3(i

Boorstin,

2.

37

Ibid., 8.
38

Ibid.

20

,

•

,

continent.

39

Boorstin hypothesized that faith in the “givenness” of concrete

American

ideals

is

so strong that certain political characteristics appear to he interconnected with the United

States

itself.

He

staled that

Americans:

have been told again and again, with the metaphorical precision of poetry, that the
United States
to believe, are

Furthermore,

lie

equality, liberty

What

if

is

the land of the free.

breathed

asserted that

in

Independence, equality, and

with our very air

Americans tend

liberty,

is

to think

correct that the average

like

.

of political conditions such as

and democracy as distinctively possessions of the United Slates
Boorstin

we

40

American

41
.

sees a distinction between

"American equality” and garden-variety equality or “ American democracy” and
rudimentary democracy?

becomes devoid of
its

American

~

If this is the case,

its literal

meaning. Instead the term

interpreter; equality, for

and “American-ness”

is all

potentially, susceptible to

then the political terminology

example,

is

Way

of Life.

39

Ibid., 9.

40
Ibid., 25.

41

Ibid.
42

Ibid.

21

question

given an abstract definition by

nothing more than “American-ness”

about equality. The above statement

manipulation by those

defenders of The American

is

in

who

is

tautological and,

profess to be the keepers and

The Source of “Givenness”
Boorstin based his notion of “givenness” on a key assumption about the American

polity.

Above

strikingly

all,

he asserted, Americans tend to believe that the history of their land

homogeneous. While admitting

actually the product of

common

set

poor historical analysis, Boorstin stated

ahistorical perspective is

continuity throughout

that this

one of the fundamental factors

American development.

4

in the

of assumptions

that this

is

is

widespread

strong feeling of cultural

'

Boorstin asserted that a noticeably orthodox political tradition developed as a

result

of the dominant paradigm

in

the

American

Boorstin claimed that the existence of an

political tradition.

Furthermore,

American orthodoxy becomes obvious when

one examines the markedly unique political behavior of citizens of the United

One example Boorstin outlined

to support his

orthodoxy hypothesis was the

number of fanatical and capricious “heresy-hunts” throughout American
Historical

moments such

War Red Scare and
I

classical

the

as the passage of the Alien

Heresy-hunts are not
repressive action

43

Ibid.,

is

inflicted

9-12.

44

1-14.

Ibid.,

1

Ibid.,

13-14.

45

and Sedition Acts,

McCarthy era were prime examples

American heresy-hunts.

44

States.

history.

the post-World

cited by Boorstin as

43

uncommon

in

modern

history, but in most nation-states such

upon practitioners of an

explicit political philosophy

by

their

ideological rivals.

branded

in

In

America, Boorstin

accordance with

stated, those

their ideology, rather, they are accused of “acts of

irreverence” against the “American creed.”

46

other words, the supposed heretics are seen as more than ideological enemies

In

within the

same

polity; they are accused of possessing ideas that arc foreign to the

“American way.” Furthermore,
American. Boorstin claimed
stated, he

accused of political heresy are not

the alleged heretics arc proclaimed to be anti- or un-

that this

tendency

is

unique to the United States. Simply

wrote that ‘“un-Italian' or ‘un-French'” are not terms used

un-American.

in

the

same way

as

47

Boorstin stated that even intellectuals are prone to
within their midst.
analysis of the

He

criticize the alleged heretics

cited critical attacks launched against Charles A. Beard's class

American

Constitution as a prime example of the kind of heresy-hunts that

took place inside the hallowed halls of academia.

In

addition to heresy-hunts, Boorstin also cited the cherished constitutional

doctrine of “original intent” as another illustration of the conspicuous orthodoxy within

American

politics.

Boorstin argued that only

persistently be taken seriously

46

by

in

America could such

intellectuals as well as

The term “American Creed”

common

a doctrine

citizens.

By

contrast,

came from economist Gunnar
Myrdal's study of race in the United States during the 1940s. See Gunnar Myrdal, An
American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper,
Ibid., 14.

1944).
47

Boorstin, 14.

48

Ibid., 18.

23

originally

lie

stated that no “sensible Briton would say that his history

implicit in

Magna

Charta and the

the unfolding of the truths

is

,,4 ‘ ;

Bill

of Rights.

The American Orthodoxy: Consensus and Continuity

Much

like Hofstadter, Boorstin asserted that there

of political thought throughout American

began

his

examination of American

history.

political

the

designed to

fit

In effect, the Puritan

conformed

techniques that allowed them

to

claimed

who

a creed

was extremely foreign

to their

that the Puritans

subdue and conquer

to their life in

was

conception of political

living in an environment that

sensibilities, Boorstin

consensus

to the Puritans.

life

a society that possessed a direct relationship with nature.

Because they were

European

a conspicuous

However, unlike Hofstadter,

Puritans, Boorstin said, created a philosophy that

American wilderness.

History

philosophy with the American Revolution,

Boorstin traced the American Consensus back

The

was

in

50

were compelled to develop

their surroundings.

In

addition to

material adaptations, Boorstin stated that the thought patterns of the Puritans were

focused around their competition with nature and with the obstacles that emanate from

From

it.

these Puritan origins, Boorstin stated, a distinct pattern of political thinking

developed within the American
of thought became cemented

49

Ibid., 15.

Ibid.,

36-38.

Ibid.,

38-39.

51

polity.

into the

As decades and centuries passed by,

this pattern

minds of subsequent generations of Americans.'

1

The American Revolution, which Boorstin said was "hardly a revolution

at all”

rather “merely a colonial rebellion,” did not pose a challenge to this political consensus.

Boorstin claimed

that,

unlike the French Revolution of the

Revolution was conservative and legalistic

against the British

same

institute British Constitutional

Similarly, Boorstin

American

history, did not

consensus.

Much

like the

governance

claimed

mark

competing

territories

According

War was

saw themselves

and unchallenged by cither side during

century struggle of the

to Boorstin, there

was simply

a

radical

a successful attempt to

American colonies.
War, while

was no

53

tremendous cataclysm

from

the

in

American

that the political

mostly legalistic wrangling between two
Boorstin asserted that instead of two

world-views, the Civil

War was

a conflict

as fighting for their specific legal rights within an

The framework, Boorstin

this titanic struggle.

Ibid.,

68-69.

Ibid.,

67-69, 8 -84 and 95-96.

Ibid.,

100-101 and 121-122.

54

it

lh

a significant ideological departure

already established political framework.

53

the

within a large nation-slate.

sides that

52

in

that the Civil

sides with distinctly different

between two

asserted that the revolt

American Revolution, Boorstin stated

discourse surrounding the Civil

geographic

authority.

ideology with this revolution; rather

in

He

American

era, the

monarch was philosophically similar to the 17

British Parliament over the

departure

in its origin.

same

1

">5

"

54

said,

remained

static

Consensus
In

addition to tracing the

in

Both

Politics

American philosophical consensus thought

Boorstin provided a thorough analysis of the

politics in the

He

identified

political

unique relationship between religion and

what he believed

to be an important

thought”

in

America /

5

Boorstin stated that an overt expression of religious faith

individual

is

who wished

important to be a

important .”

to

member of a

church... (w)hich particular church

essential for

is

any
that “it

far less

56

enlightening. Political life thrived in the

sophisticated pursuit

In

was

have a significant political impact on America. He said

For Boorstin, the parallel between politics and religion

nourishes

history,

between the philosophic consensus and the frequent “mingling of religious

correlation

and

United Slates.

and Religion

in this

United States

in spite

was simple,

yet

of the noticeable lack of a

toward a guiding political ideology. Similarly, he said

country” while “theology and religious studies languish."

that “religion

7

sum, Boorstin considered the general acceptance of religion and the equally

wide-ranging rejection of theology as significant reinforcement for the existence of his

doctrine of “givenness.” Basically, he asserted that

often disadvantageous to adopt an

Americans

find

overarching theory that explains

it

unnecessary and

political, social or

even

spiritual relations.

that certainty is

imbued

All

eneompassing theories

in the institutions

are extraneous hceause they believe

of this continent.

The Impact of “Givenness" on American

Political

Thought

Boorstin’s conclusions concerning the impact of “givenness" on American
politics arc as distinctive as his observations

of the

political scene in the United States.

Based upon Boorstin's observations, one could potentially build
scathing critique of the

history

and

American

American

political relations.

politics,

polity and the naivete of

its

However, rather than finding

Boorstin celebrated

it

and considered

it

the foundation for a

citizens concerning their

fault with the

to be a

uniqueness of

mark of inherent

“genius."

Boorstin claimed that there was profundity

American

politics.

He

in

the apparent simplicity of

explained his conclusions with an analogy; he compared the

perceived political consensus with the religious practice of the Ancient Hebrews.
Boorstin stated that:

When

the Temple of Solomon in Jerusalem fell in 63 B.C. and Pompey invaded
Holy of Holies, he found to his astonishment that it was empty. This was, of
course, a symbol of the absence of idolatry, which was the essential truth of
Judaism. Perhaps the same surprise awaits the student of American culture, if he
w
finally manages to penetrate the Arcanum of our belief.
the

For Boorstin, the lack of “idolatry"

in

American

politics can be

found

in the

perceived wide-ranging rejection of essentialist political theories along with the general

Ibid.,

133 and 137-8.

Ibid., 170.
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acceptance of a theory-less philosophical consensus. He claimed

that the rejection

of

ideological idolatry discouraged political attempts to overhaul society based upon grand
visions of

human

nature and

human

social relations.

tendency to dismiss

Instead, our

theoretic idols fostered a healthy pragmatism and a (small e) conservative tendency

American

politics.

extremes of the
the

The

result of such a traditionalist consensus

is

that

in

perspectives on the

political spectrum remain rather unpopular and quite unlikely to disrupt

smooth functioning of

0

the polity/'

Furthermore. Boorstin asserted

and the strong sense of

that the

historical continuity led

States a nation of destiny.

He

combination of a lack of political idolatry

many Americans

consider the United

to

referred to this feeling of destiny as “seamlcssness.”

As

with “givenness”, he viewed the perceived phenomenon of “seamlessness” as a positive
value because

it

cultivated a feeling of togetherness and unity

At the beginning and again

one

final

in

American polity/

1

'

the closing pages of his book, Boorstin provided

that the

unique “genius" of American

one of a kind and cannot be replicated
he stated, America

Western world.

is

in

different and separate

Just as

European

Ibid., 3

61

Ibid.,

politics, literally, is

other nation-states. Materially and historically,

from the remainder of the world, including

political ideologies did not play well in

our American pragmatism could not be exported

60

the

observation that will be very important for our study of American

Exceptionalism. He asserted

the

in

and 175-176.

175-177.
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America,

to countries that did not share in

our

unique history and geography.

As he constructed
weakness

potential

his

62

argument, however, Boorstin seemingly glossed over a

in his theory.

He did

not take into account that while both

“givenness" and “seamlessness" represented a repudiation of a classical philosophical

orthodoxy they
continue

also, in effect, represented a political

this exploration

possibility that the

theory

of American Exceptionalism,

in their

own

we must make room

next theorist would also argue that there

politics.

Yet,

in

contrast to Boorstin, he

ideological terms. Louis Hart/,

Boorstin, had a background

was

1

a resilient political consensus in

would define

was a Harvard professor who,

in socialist

completely abandoned the idea

American

for the

Western Europe.

Louis Hart/ and the Liberal Tradition in America

American

As we

American consensus may very well be an ideology as meaningful as

the various theories developed in

Our

right.

that

like

consensus

in

Hofstadter and

thought. However, by the 1950s, Hart/ had

that socialism

could have a meaningful impact upon the

political scene.

Hartz's

most important contribution

to the study

attempt to explain the development of political ideology

of political theory was his
in the

were conquered and colonized by Europeans. Hartz claimed

62

Ibid.,

MA

regions of the world that

that nations

such as the

4-6 and 186-187.

was adapted from chapter 2 of my Masters thesis. See
Michael D. D'Amore, “C. L. R. James on the ‘American Civilization': The Contrasts
between James and Louis Hartz on the Subjects of American Individualism and the
Liberal Tradition,” (M.A. thesis. University of Vermont, 1998), 17-27.
portion of this section
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United States, Canada, South Africa, Australia, and the countries of Latin America

developed into societies

In

in

were "fragments" of their European colonizers.

that

terms of political ideology. Hart/, asserted that these

new

<vl

nations became stuck

time and developed a political culture that almost unquestionably accepted the

philosophy of

that the

European conquerors

its

at

the time of the original settlement.

acceptance of the founding ideology

in

these

new

societies

sank "beneath the surface of thought to the level of an assumption."
For the purposes of this study,

American
case."

political culture.

among

we

will concentrate

historical

defined liberal tradition.

superficial

it

05

on Hartz's analysis of the

development and recorded patterns of

He claimed

that political

in

America

debate

in

is

00

political action in the

are framed by a rigidly

America

disagreements between factions that share the

presuppositions. Hartz's thought

“

that

Hartz claimed that the United States presents "the clearest

United States, Hartz concluded that political conflicts

04

was so deep

European fragments, of the ideological dominance of liberalism.

the

Based on

more than

Hart/ stated

is

often nothing

same Lockean

based on the premise that the lack of a dominant

Hartz 1964, 3-5.

Ibid., 5.

00

Tom Wicker gives an excellent summary of Hartz's definition of
Wicker states that a liberal "is one who believes in individual liberty,
equality, and capitalism and who regards the human marketplace, where a person
Ibid., 72.

liberalism.

own

proper testing ground of
achievement." See Tom Wicker, introduction to The Liberal Tradition in America, by
Louis Hartz (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1991), ix.
succeeds or

fails

by

his or her

efforts

and

ability, as the

feudal experience in
.

mature.

America caused

this particularly fixed ideology of liberalism to

67

If

Americans are "born equal"

0*

as Hart/, theorized then they arc born without the

residue the socio-political hierarchy indicative of feudalism. Americans also lack another

remnant of feudalism; simply, a sense

most submissive,

the

reliant

is

upon

that

each social

the others for

its

class,

from the most dominant

continued existence. The important

tendencies of a feudal residue, which Hartz's claimed was missing
history of

communal

to

in

America, included a

social arrangements, a feeling of class identity, a sense of both

competing and cooperative class

interests,

and a background

in internal

revolutionary

process.

Hartz explained that due to this distinctly equal and individualistic existence,
alternatives to liberalism, such as socialism,

lie

stated, often arc rejected out

sense of

life

communal

and culture.

07

relations

seem

alien to

Americans. Such

alternatives,

of hand by Americans because they are based on

and class identity

--

two

traits that are

missing

in

a strong

American

00

Hartz 1991,

14-15 and 68-69. Hartz defines feudalism as the "institutions of

3,

system with a monarchical form of government, the existence
of a landed gentry that rule over their fiefdoms and the peasantry that live and work on
the land, strict traditions of inheritance of land and property, etc.).
the medieval era"

0H

69

(i. e.,

a

Hartz borrows here from Tocqueville.
Ibid., 5-6.
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Locke’s Impact on the United States
In

Once

The Liberal Tradition

in

America, Hartz presented

again, he argued that the United Slates

a unique

is

his

argument

example of

in great detail.

the practice and

socialization of the classical liberal doctrine, specifically the liberalism expressed in the

writings of the English philosopher

a bastion for an uncritical

acceptance of the liberal norm. This

perceive to be inherent in any

aspect of their

own

John Locke. According to Hartz, the United States

Lockean

Lockeans simply because "the American

Locke which usually docs not

know

that

Way

created by the

in

that

Americans

yet prevalent

general, were not standard, garden

Lockeans.

of Life

(is)

70

Americans

two

are irrational

a nationalist articulation of

Locke himself is involved."

Locke's theory of liberalism comprises

is

norm

national identity.

liberals, but rather, "irrational"

Locke's argument

a

"good and just" society, and an unspoken,

Furthermore, Hartz claimed that Americans,

variety

is

71

distinct arguments.

The

an implicit defense of the state as legitimate because

common

consent of the masses. For Locke, the state

is

it

first

is

half of

the entity

the exclusive

purveyor of coercive power via the social contract.

The execution of this power

attempt to serve the needs and wants of the polity

entirely appropriate as long as the

state

complies with the limitations of the contract.

70

Ibid., 15.

71

Ibid.,

72

Ibid.,

1

is

I

59-60.
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is

“

in

an

The obligation of the
contract

is

state to use

powers within

its

the confines of the social

the second half of Locke's theoretical claim. This portion of Locke' theory

involves the explicit limitation of state power over the individual citizen. Hartz asserted

that this

second claim

community.

the only part of

Locke acknowledged

to this thesis,

Americans,

in general,

second Lockean supposition alone. Hartz claimed

American

political thought"

was behind

this ideology.

enlightenment concepts of individuality and social
the basic belief in "atomistic social

that the

settlers

main reason
found on

Europeans

who

freedom"

for this bold assumption

this continent.

Because of

Once

again,

political

that the "master

Unlike Europe, where the liberal-

liberty

were subject

unquestioned

is

was

we

assumption of

in

to furious debate,

America. Hartz asserted

the unique social situation that the

are

made

new

to understand that the

traditions, or, for

74
all.

this veritable state

of nature, social freedom was won by the new

Americans on an individual or small group

74

American

operate within the framework of

colonized America discovered a land without feudal

Hartz, any traditions at

73

in the

73

According
this

is

level, not through

mass party participation

Ibid., 60.

Ibid., 62.

The

fact that there

were thriving

social conditions

among

the native

"new" continent apparently did not concern European settlers (though
may be a more accurate term) all that much. Similarly, Hartz does
not seem to pay particular attention to the fact that many complex political
cultures were expunged from the continent by the European settlers along with the
people who created them. For the purpose of this work wc understand that it is
the perception of the European settlers that is the key to Hartz's thesis; therefore,
tribes of the

"conquerors"

we

accept his claim

in this context.

33

and social revolution,

was

as

the case in Europe. There were no feudal lords here, just

indigenous population, whose land was
response to this situation was

Mayflower Compact.

As

to enter into a "social contract," the first

to

change the

rules of

being through a series of individual claims

by the same individuals who

In this sense, free

development of the

as an outside force

people came

state

- one

to a given area

laid

claim

first in

to

came

into

it.

America and then they were followed by

compensation

between the Lockean conception of

it

the

and the enforcement of that

state, therefore, is

that primarily seeks to constrain liberty

in

power and

government and law. Rather,

through a social contract. The

provides for the general welfare

is

being The

Unlike Europe, the establishment of a political society

not brought about by the popular usurpation of state

subsequent struggle

the

settlers’

77

into again and again.

America was

requisition

The American

the settlers migrated across the American frontier, this liberal right of founding

was entered
in

ripe for occupation.

an

perceived

and only secondarily

for that loss of liberty.

The balance

a state that equally constrains, protects

and provides

not present in standard American political discourse.

The Prevalence of Liberalism
Because of this imbalance, Hartz

skewed toward

fear

and

in

American History

asserted that American political

distrust of the state. This unique attitude

development

toward the

is

state brings

an equally unique history to America; any government action beyond the basic tasks of

75

Ibid.,

60-61.
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defending

(lie

nation and

government playing
consideration

in

our

The concept of

a profound social role in public affairs is not often a topic

political

considered sacrosanct.

her/himself

inhabitants has always been held in suspect.

its

is

It

discourse because the will of the individual

commonly

in her/his relentless

is

of

almost always

held that the rugged individual can rely only on

"pursuit of happiness."

Therefore, the quest for improved living conditions

the individual in America. Pulling oneself

is

isolated to the

up by one’s “bootstraps”

is

domain of

the only

acceptable means of upward mobility. At the same time, the legitimacy of the state

providing for the social welfare of

its

citizens

tempered by the belief

is

that the state

almost always a hostile actor and almost always seeks to limit individual rights

is

when

its

acts.

It

follows from

this

perception, that various possibilities for social

advancement

through state involvement arc rarely perceived by Americans as worth the accompanying
erosion of individual rights

at the

hands of the

outlook, the scope of social welfare policy

compared

to the nation-states of

Hart/,

claimed

state.

in the

As

a result of this unique political

United States has been limited when

Western Europe.

that the prevailing liberal

paradigm

in

America overwhelmed

oriented and community-based methods of social action throughout

Hartz devoted the bulk of

his

liberalism and

its

history.

book. The Liberal Tradition in America, to illustrating this

effect of irrational Lockcanism.

American

American

state-

Once

again, his assertion

accompanying

was

distaste for state

35

that the

prevalence of

power shaped American

development. Liberalism
considered

in

in

America ultimately

led to the exclusion of alternatives

other parts of the developed world,

such as socialist democracy.

The American Revolution

Much
Revolution

in

from British

like

Hofstadter and Boorstin, Hartz tells the story of the

decidedly non-revolutionary terms.

rule

The

colonists liberated the continent

and formalized the tenants of liberalism into a federal system of

government. However, unlike their fellow liberal revolutionaries

later,

American

in

France only a decade

Americans did not need to unite on the basis of class or any similar identity

destroy an indigenous feudal elite in a bloody revolution.

The American Revolution was

a

war

to

76

to revise an antiquated social contract

between the colonists and their British lords. After the war, most farmers went back to
their land

and

tried to live as before.

professionals. Finally, the

that

it

true of the urban artisans

and

government of the new nation was not radically changed from

of the pre-revolutionary Continental Congress.

historic event, but

new

The same was

was not an upheaval

The American Revolution was

that radically

a

reshaped social relations on the

77

continent.

The French Revolution, by
which successfully

contrast,

was a

altered the very structure

of French society and subsequently changed

the fundamental social relations in that nation.

76

Ibid., 36.

77

Ibid.,

revolt motivated by class interests

35-43.

36

The newly created

relations

were forged

by ihc struggle of the various classes present

in

French society

eighteenth century. Post-revolutionary France was a

political struggle

and

it

new

at the

end of the

society formed out of the

reflected the class differences that played an integral part

in its

creation.

War Development

Post-Revolutionary

Hartz claimed that after the Revolutionary War, the psychology of American
liberalism

became

ail

encompassing. The

early days of the United States

adherents to the

new European

vigorous class conflict that

in

seemed
liberal

became

to

political disputes

among

various factions

in

the

resemble the factional disputes among

and enlightenment

tradition, rather than the

a standard feature of European political development

the nineteenth century.

A
that

prime example of conflict American-style was Shays'

Shays and his guerilla army did not seek

to seize the

rebellion.

Hartz asserted

farmland of Western

Massachusetts from the major local landholders and operate these lands as a
Rather, Shays’

army consisted of independent farmers who

measures to save their personal slice of land during a
Hartz claimed that American rebels
similar philosophy.

property,

All of

who

followed

them were propelled

difficult

compelled

into action

their

to take drastic

economic depression.

in the tradition

which was seen as a means for perpetuating

37

felt

collective.

by the

of Shays held

to a

fear of losing their

independence and

self-

reliance.

These rebellious Americans were

winning a new society,

not,

like the followers of

however, motivated by the dream of

Marx and Engels

'

in

Europe.

Within these early American disputes, however, Hartz found an

interesting

contradiction between reality and perception on the part of the wealthiest citizens of

America. The upper class, observing events

like Shays' rebellion, perceived that they

were being attacked by their class enemies, but
looking for the same thing
for her/himself.

-

in reality

both groups were ostensibly

the right of the individual to provide an independent living

79

Hartz claimed that the struggle between the perceived

Americans

American
their

illustrated the

As

society.

predominance of the

a whole,

liberal

common Americans

working class counterparts

in

United States desired to someday

this

we compare

According

Americans

Ibid.,

69-75.

Ibid.,

93-95.

79

classes of

rather the proletariat in the

attain extensive wealth in their

own

right.

Individualism

liberal belief

that will

imbued within

prove to be most

all

of the various classes of

to seek individualistic answers to their problems.

to this analysis, the quintessential “self-made

78

common

his thought with that of the other writers in this study.

Hartz stated that the preeminent
led

all

and the

did not detest the wealthy as did

observation Hartz reached the conclusion

important for us as

American society

norm among

European countries, but

The Triumph of American

From

aristocrats

38

man” of the

nineteenth eentury

Horatio Alger

Hart/,

stories,

observed

becomes

that the goals

the poster child for

two hundred years of American

of average Americans, be they

80
life.

yeoman farmers or an

toward the bourgeois "concepts of property and

industrial laborers, are geared

individualism."

From

we

Hartz's position,

find a nation

where governmental action, communal

responses, and specifically socialistic responses to social needs arc seen as anathema.

Such thought, Hart/ claimed,
fact, the

is

relegated to the outer fringes of

only prevailing communal value

Lockeanism

that despises anything

in

American

is

American

society.

In

an ardent and irrational

which stands outside of the

liberal

norm of

individual

o->

enterprise, properly rights, and restricted government.

As he analyzed American

history, Hartz

“

focused on the urban classes, and paid

particular attention to the absence of a

committed rank and

lack of a strong, successful socialistic

movement

Hart/,

"Marx

no yearning

dies (in America) because there

union

movement and

the

United States. According to

no sense of class, no

spirit

of revolution,

for the corporate past."'

The implication here
prime ideological objective

80

Ibid.,

is

is

that

not

workers will not organize as a class because their

grounded

in their

62-63.

81

Ibid., 123.

82

Ibid.,

83

is

in the

file

55-58.

Hartz 1964,

7.
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collective

membership

in the

working

class.

In

America, Ihc goal of the working class

economic

status

three intellectuals profiled

their findings, but their conclusions

began

movement

most of these incipient entrepreneurs.

The Lessons Learned from

all

above" their current socio-

and enter the bourgeoisie; a class-based political and social

will be considered unattractive to

The

to "rise

is

the

Cold

War Consensus School

above employed different approaches to arrive

were very much

their scholarly pursuits as practitioners (to

in

harmony with one

at

They

another.

one degree or another) of left-wing

ideology and subsequently jettisoned their ideological roots once they reached their
professional maturity. During this process, they

transcendent consensus exists

in

American

came

political

to an

agreement on the belief

that a

thought and that this consensus

reached back to the very beginning of the American experience. Moreover, they

concurred that

all

this

consensus was so overwhelmingly dominant that

it

practically erased

other ideological options from the public discourse in the United States.

In

common

addition to their general agreement, these three intellectuals reached

inferences that will prove to be important for our

American Exceplionalisrn thought on the
following three sections,

I

will

effect they

all

settled

ideology of America,

own

examination of the impact of

discourse of our present era.

distinct

in the

American Consensus

terminology to describe the consensus, but

on the same definition. Unlike Boorstin

in fact,

were much more precise

in

In the

enumerate the most important of these conclusions.

Individualism

All three use their

political

some

was no ideology

at all,

who argued

that the

Hofstadter and (especially) Hartz

describing the most defining aspects of the

40

in

American

consensus. For them, the American consensus, roughly, follows the tenets of the

classical liberal tradition.

individual property

There

is

a particular emphasis upon the defense of the right to

ownership and a general preference expressed

for the interests of

individual citizens over the interests of the government.

Furthermore, Hofstadtcr, Hartz and to some extent Boorstin stressed the
schizophrenic nature of American liberalism. The celebration of the isolated rugged

individual

is

placed

far into the forefront

of American

collective or fraternal tendencies arc practically

Just as the individual

is

political

mythology while

unacknowledged by

the

same

tradition.

prized above the assemblage on the domestic political

scene, the parochial interests of the United States in foreign affairs arc often placed far

above the interests of mutual respect

among

nation-states and international co-existence.

Given these assumptions, issues of international relations arc most

likely to be considered

from a strongly

isolationist

(as Hofstadtcr predicted)

nationalistic

and possibly even

point-of-view.

Within such a framework, a foreign policy argument premised upon an “us versus

them”

We

attitude will likely often

win more adherents than

a

more cooperative approach.

need to remain cognizant of this possibility, particularly as

attitudes surrounding the

the political

contemporary war on terrorism.

Anti-lntellectualism

In

we examine

in

the

American Consensus

addition to the strong predilection for the individual over the collective,

three of our observers, particularly Boorstin

all

and Hartz, discussed anti-intellectualism

American consensus. Hartz seemed deeply frustrated by
41

the “irrationality” of

in

American

political thought,

intclleetualism.

while Boorstin found something positive

own

American

Nevertheless, both asserted that the disparagement of

deeply affected the manner

their

in

Two

history.

in

which most Americans perceive both

ant

i

intellectual inquiry

social relations

important and related by-products of American

and

anti-

ism arc the tendency to homogenize the American experience and the

intellectual

propensity to ascribe a divine quality to American historical development. Boorstin's

chapter on “The Mingling of Political and Religious Thought"

regarding the second inclination.

It

is

particularly illuminating

M

should not be surprising that there was a general tendency

to exaggerate the

homogeneity of the American experience during the Cold War. The United
just

overcome two of the most

World War

II.

significant crises in

its

States had

history - the Great Depression and

Moreover, the post-war world order gradually became

further and further

dominated by the competition between United States and the Soviet Union. During the
1950s, the danger of

one wrong move leading

very real concern that united Americans of

In addition,

would elevate

the United States

this nation-state to

all

to the annihilation of the entire globe

demographic backgrounds.

was experiencing an economic expansion

an unprecedented status

prosperity

was not being shared equally among

perception

among

the

all

dominant class of citizens

achievable.

Boorstin, 133-160.
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was

in

world history.

citizens, but there

that the

was

a

that

In reality,

popular

American Dream was

a

In

both these good and bad times, surely there must have been a strong sense that

our respective differences were secondary
other time

young existence

in its

Additionally,

to national unity.

unity within the

American

polity

more than any

must have seemed both

possible and indispensable for the future success of the nation-state.

Similarly, a call for unity within the

American polity was alluded

to

by many

citizens of various political stripes in the days immediately following the terrorist attacks

of September

I

must remember

1

,

2001

.

that the

As we compare

these

yearning for sameness

moments of crisis and
is

uncertainty,

we

often a powerful stabilizing force in

moments of volatility.
The Uniqueness of the American Consensus
Finally, both Boorstin and Hartz shared the

consensus

made

is

truly “exceptional” as

it

this point explicitly clear at the

argument. For Hartz,

this

American founding could

on Terrorism, we

American

beginning and again

at

the conclusion of his

not be replicated, so

in

American

it

politics

was

logical to

would

presume

some

that the

not likely surface

extreme

anywhere

contemporary

else.

War

contradictory statements regarding the ability to export

thought to other around the globe. Sometimes, the contemporary

exceptionalist discourse will focus on the absolute uniqueness of the

democracy while other discussions

making

American

cannot be exported to other nation-states. Boorstin

the exceptionalist discourse surrounding the

will find

political

that the

assumption was implicit; the unique conditions surrounding the

version of liberalism found

As we examine

assumption

the rest of the world

more

will concentrate

like the

on the need

United States.

43

to

American

achieve stability by

We
role

of Exceplionalism following September

discussion of the post-September

1

lh
1

l

.

end of the 20

lh

century.

politics

The

of the 2

However, before wc begin our

llh political discourse,

evolution of Exceptionalist thought from the Cold

engage the

above into our discussion of the

will incorporate the three tendencies outlined

next chapter will detail this

century

in

chapter four.

44

first

discuss the

War Consensus School thorough

s1
I

wc must

direct

development; then

we

will

the

CHAPTER
RECENT TRENDS

IN

3

AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM
Introduction

In this

chapter,

I

will discuss the evolution

Exeeptionalism beyond the Cold

remove consensus theory from
chapter,

its

Cold War

origins; as

We

in

is

nearly impossible to

we have
as a

seen

means

consensus would change to meet the
raises several important

new

the post-World

Cold War drew

should, therefore, expect that as the

the previous

in

to explain the

War

the globe that

era.

II

to a close, the narrative of

material conditions. The

fall

of the Soviet

questions regarding American Exeeptionalism. Did the

United States prevail over the Soviets because of

superior) ideals?

It

between the United States polity and the portion of

under the influence of Marxism-Leninism

Union

school.

American Exeeptionalism was a doctrine forged

essential differences

fell

War consensus

of the theory of American

War

Did the end of the Cold

its

also

truly “exceptional” (in this case, read

mean

the end to the major

impediment preventing the spread of the American Ideal around the globe?
United Stales remain “exceptional” (in this case, read unique)

if

wake of the Soviet collapse? And

spread across the globe in the

the

Would

American

finally,

ideal

would

challenge rise against the “Exeeptionalism” (in this case read both superior

the

a

new

and unique)

of the United States?

An argument could be made

that both

contemporary

conservatives are the inheritors of the legacy of

purposes of this dissertation,

1

will focus

liberals

and contemporary

American Exeeptionalism. For

the

upon the connection between American
45

Exceptionalism and conservative ideology

American Exceptionalism and contemporary conservative thought

association between

will

the following chapter. Locating the

in

War

both illuminate the post-Cold

perspective on American uniqueness and

our understanding of the rhetorical position of the Bush administration
matters connected with the aftermath of September

My

mission

in this

chapter

is

1

two-fold. First.

theory of American Exceptionalism out of

foreign policy

1th.

1

will follow the evolution of the

Cold War context and

its

in

assess

its

meaning

will

examine

the “exceptional” characteristics of

distinctly conservative theories that

emerged

in the

contemporary times. Second,

1

facilitate

wake of the

in

two

collapse of the Soviet

Union.

American Exceptionalism

after the

The work of sociologist Seymour Martin Lipsct
to that

of the Consensus theorists discussed

in

is

Cold War
comparable and complimentary

the previous chapter. During the 1950s

and 1960s, Lipsct studied various American institutions and concluded

that a social

consensus existed with regards to certain fundamental values.
In his

1963 book. The First

New Nation

,

Lipsct argued that equality and

achievement were two deep-seated American values forged during the conflict of the
Revolutionary Era. Furthermore, he asserted that these two core values remained
relatively

unchanged

into the

20

lh

century.

In addition,

he posited

that these static values

helped to shape and preserve a unique and lasting American character

85

that

withstood the

For the connection between exceptionalism and neoliberalism, see Rick

Fantasia and

Kim Voss, Hard Work

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).
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forces of change brought on by the dramatically evolving material conditions over the

past

200

years.

86

For Lipsct. the values of equality and achievement were not always

complimentary;

in fact,

he claimed that they often conflicted with one another. However,

he claimed that the conflict between the two, almost dialectically, helped determine the
character of both American social thought and
Lipset

is vital

to

Exceptionalism because

political institutions in the

United States.*

our understanding of the contemporary meaning of American
his intellectual inquiry into the

during the Cold War, but

is

then revisited

Union. Lipset, therefore, serves as an

all

in the

American consensus begins

aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet

important bridge between the Cold

War

consensus school and our contemporary understanding of American Exceptionalism.
Exceptional Alter All These Years

Still

The

fall

War certainly

of Soviet-style

Communism

signaled a significant change

in the

in the

early 1990s

and the end of the Cold

global political order.

The end of

the

four decade-long bi-polar struggle was a victory for the United States and, by
implication, the American

way of

life.

Those ideologically pre-disposed to accept the

theory of American Exceptionalism might further point
States as an indispensable contributing factor to

its

to the

uniqueness of the United

victory over the Soviet Union.

Lipset does not address the root cause of the Cold War’s end, nor does he

86

Seymour Marlin Lipset, The First New Nation: The United States in Historical
and Comparative Perspective (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 1-7, 16 and 104.
,

87

Ibid.,

7

101-104.
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conclude that America's uniqueness always translates

into superiority.

However, he does

undertake a thorough examination of the status of American Exceptionalism twice

decade following the Soviet collapse.

2000 book.

In their

and co-author Gary Marks reach the conclusion
though public policy formulation

more closely resemble

in

that

It

Didn

't

in the

Happen Here Lipset
,

America remains exceptional even

comparable countries of Western Europe began

making

political decision

in the

United States during the

to

final

decade of the twentieth century.
Specifically, Lipset

and Marks asserted

that the industrially developed

world

experienced a period of political moderation following the Cold War. This period was

marked by a noticeable
social

shift

towards the

political center

democratic parties. Accompanying
'

this ideological shift

same

the political center and

aside the class-based competition that

discourse for

many

the centrist ideological drift in the

Ibid.,

many

a central

part. Lipset

if

West

one accepts

the dismantling of

established policies

nation-stales of the

component of their
and Marks claimed

their thesis,

West began

273-278.

48

to

political

that

American

to party politics

and

one could conclude that

signaled an end to the uniqueness of American

Lipset and Marks, 262-263.

8y

away from

been devoid of the class-based approach

public policy formulation. Therefore,

88

was

decades. For the most

politics has historically

was

many European

countries.

designed to deliver social democratic outcomes,

set

part of

S2Q

•

select facets ol the welfare state in those

By moving toward

on the

politics.

90

During the 1990s, Western
political left, such as the British

parties

which had previously leaned decidedly to the

Labor Party, began to very closely resemble the

moderately left-of-center ideological position of the Democratic Party
States.

However,

political center

at

the

same

time, the Democratic Party

under the leadership of President

Bill

in the

United

was moving even closer

to the

Clinton and the Democratic

Leadership Council. Therefore, as formerly left-wing parties drifted toward the center
(and, therefore, closer to the Democrats

in the

United States), the already centrist

Democratic Party moved even further towards the center of the

political

spectrum.

91

After considering the political push toward the center during the 1990s, Lipset

and Marks concluded

that the

United States remains exceptional

taxation, social spending levels, union

factors, Lipset

membership and economic inequality. These

the lower class in a given polity (e.g. higher levels

often correlate with greater political power

is

power

in a pluralist political

answerable to a cross-section of

class might

mean

90

Ibid.,

key indicators such as

and Marks asserted, are closely correlated with the amount of political

power possessed by

diffusion of

in

a

its

in the

system

of social spending

hands of the lower class). Since the

is

essential to ensure that the

citizenry, the lack

of power vested

troublesome lack of democratic responsiveness

262-263. Lipset and Marks argued

that, in spite

in

government

in the

the

lower

American

of the pre-industrial

origins of American Exceptionalism, modern claims to Exceptionalism can be reduced to
the absence of a sustained and viable socialist or working class political

United Slates.
91

Ibid.,

274-276.
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movement

in the

political system.

As

stated previously, the

American working class has had great difficulty

obtaining and particularly sustaining an independent grasp on political

United States.

In their

concluding remarks, Lipset and

translate to other groups outside the status

their speculation

effects

beyond

is

War

notably for the purposes of

will

dominate the

in the

we might conclude

correct, than

the Cold

quo

power

Marks suggested

American

that

in the

that this

may

political hierarchy.

If

American Exceptional ism has

question of socialism (or the lack thereof) in America.

this dissertation,

political discourse

we might expect

of the United States.

Most

to find that elite opinion

93

The Double-Edged Sword
Four years before

ll

American Exceptionalism
title

Didn't

in

the

Happen Here,

Lipset addressed the question of

more recent wake of

the

Cold War's demise. Lipsct’s

American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword accurately summarizes

conclusions

at that

his

time concerning the American Consensus. Specifically, Lipset

interested in analyzing both the perceived positive and negative ramifications of

alleged political and social uniqueness.

himself as an adherent

to the idea

As with

his

was

our

subsequent book, Lipset positioned

of Exceptionalism defined merely with reference to

difference and not concerning any particular notion of superiority.

Rather than exclusively extol the virtues of American Exceptionalism, Lipset

92

Ibid.,

262-292.

Ibid.,

292-294.

93

50

of our outlier status are equally positive and negative. He

concluded

that the results

states that

American Exceptionalism has been a contributing

a polity that displays

for individual rights

that

unmatched

factor to the

development of

levels of optimism, productivity, volunteerism, concern

and upward mobility. However, Lipset claimed

that the

same

factors

encourage the above attributes also contribute to a society tainted by high crime

rates, significant inequalities in

litigiousness

To

wealth, low rates of political participation, high levels of

and a general “disregard for communal good.”

better evaluate both the positive

44

and negative impact of American

Exceptionalism, Lipset endeavored to define a set of exceptional

referred to these traits as the

American Creed

in five

“American Creed.”

traits to

study.

He

Basically, Lipset described the

broad terms of “liberty, egalitarianism, individualism, populism

and laissez-faire” supplemented by unusually strong religious fervor. The religious

component observed by Lipset
individualistic

and messianic

is

important for our purposes as

in nature.

it

tends to be both very

45

Exceptionalism and Conflict
Lipset claimed that the individualistic climate

religious tradition that focuses

in

America, combined with a

on human perfectibility deeply

affects the

way

that the

American polity addresses important matters, most notably questions of war and peace.

44

Lipset 1996,

20 and 268.

45

There are considerable similarities between Lipset's definition of the
“American Creed” and Daniel Boorstin's theory which is discussed in Chapter 2 of this
Ibid., 19.

dissertation.
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As

a result of our exceptional ist nature, Lipscl asserted that both support lor

resistance to

that

war tend

to be presented in exceedingly moral terminology. Lipsct stated

average Americans endorse a war

being on God's side against Satan

-

if

they can define the role of the United States “as
96

for morality, against evil."

Lipsct noted that comparative public opinion surveys

significantly

more

from more than
a

patriotic

and more willing

thirty similar nation-states.

He concluded

instead of wars for specific material interests.

Lipsct stated that

American wars

“moral goals, such as the quest

recent

empire.”

‘to

He

make

In the

that

Americans are

that this outlier status

is

due

to

fights crusades “to destroy evil”

97

are almost always presented as struggles for

the world safe for democracy,”' or a cataclysmic

cited the 1991 Persian Gulf

example of the sometimes tortured

world view.

show

to fight in their country’s wars than citizens

dominant popular conception that the United Stales

battle against an “evil

and

War

against Iraq as a

emanates from such

logic that

a moralistic

run-up to Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein, who was a

peripheral ally of the United States for

many

was demonized

years

as “the incarnation of

absolute evil" and “another Hitler.” Clearly, the leader of Iraq was a brutal dictator

both committed and ordered the commission of atrocities for

crimes only seemed to reach the level of criticism
process of launching a

war against

his country.

when

At

many

However,

years.

the United States

who

was

that point, the reporting

his

in the

and criticism

of his crimes were exaggerated
he

was

to epic proportions;

no longer was he simply a thug, hut

the incarnation of the greatest evil the world has ever seen.

Lipset claimed that the

same

moralistic

paradigm

that

dominates American’s

thinking about foreign affairs also heavily impacts the nature of internal conflict

throughout our history. United States history has more than

its

share of deep, and often

bloody, social conflict. Arguably, America has had more violent internal conflict

in its

past than any other developed country. Lipset concluded that the fierce nature of conflict

in

America can be

objectives

attributed to the tendency of contesting groups to

in intense moralistic

terms rather than

in rationally

frame

their

defined material interests.

w

Lipset also noted that boundaries are established which determine the appropriate

form

that internal conflict takes in the United States.

“Americanism” becomes an ideology unto
measured by one's adherence

itself.

to the tenets of the

In this

exceptional ist context,

One’s loyalty

to

Americanism

American Creed. Those who appear

stand against those basic tenets are labeled “anti-American” or “un-American.”

Ibid.,
94

Ibid.,

is

to

100

65-67.
25-26. Lipset cautioned his reader not to confuse the existence of an

He argued

that any evaluation of
between
groups to determine
divergence

ideological consensus with the absence of conflict.

American must look carefully at the
whether the contesting parties truly operate from

conflict in

Lipset asserted that contesting parties

identifiably different class positions.

United States generally do not operate from

in the

different class positions and concluded that internal strife

conflict between those

who

11)11

Ibid., 3

1

.

Again,

is

best describe as internecine

define the American Creed differently.

we

find a strong

Boorstin’s theory. See Chapter 2 of

comparison between Lipset and Daniel
discussion of Boorstin’s

this dissertation for a brief

perspective on the claim of anti-Americanism.

53

Much

like Boorstin, Lipscl asserted that the

developed world

to

have crafted such an extreme national

cannot become un-English or un-Swedish”

“un-American.” Perhaps,

American

in

the

terminology considered to be a

Whether
in static

is

it

on

a

the only polity in the

He

compromise

is

political

at least a

“one

margins of the

“Amcrican-ness”

in

the face of

radicals speak of their mission in

of the American Creed.

difficult to resolve

stated that

one can be considered

domestic or international scale, conflict that

moral beliefs

that participants

traditional part

many

that

on the

polity have historically attempted to assert their

is

identity.

same way

this is the reason that radicals

charges to the contrary. Lipscl pointed out that

rooted

United States

because

it

101

is

perceived to be

almost inevitably demands

portion of their core values to reach a peaceful

settlement. Moreover, the internal group decision to engage in such conflict in the first

place

is

difficult to debate rationally for the

same reason. Conflict framed

in

moral terms

discourages resolution and complex reasoning and encourages aggressive behavior and
simplistic thinking. Lipset's theory on the link

between American Exceptionalism and

conflict will certainly inform our analysis in the next chapter as

the specific rhetoric

employed by President George W. Bush

we

take a direct look at

to explain his

War on

Terrorism.

The Connection between Neo-Hegelianism and American Exceptionalism
If

Marx

represents the

101

truly stood Hegel onto his philosophical head, then Francis

first

Lipset

and most vociferous post-Cold

19%,

War

31 and Lipsct and Marks, 265.
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Fukuyama

attempt to turn Hegel around

again.

summer

In

1989,

Fukuyama caused an

“The End of History?” The piece appeared

in

intellectual uproar with an article entitled

The National

Interest an overtly
,

conservative journal of international affairs and proffered a neo-Hegelian analysis of the

imminent

in

fall

of the Soviet Union. Simply,

Fukuyama

asserted that the end of Leninism

Russia marked “an unabashed victory” for classical liberalism.

|

|p~

Fukuyama and History
The focus of Fukuyama’s analysis was “the realm of ideas or consciousness.” He
assented to the incompleteness of liberal

preeminence

in the material

world of 1989, but

he confidently asserted that “there arc powerful reasons for believing that (classical

liberalism)

is

govern the material world

the ideal that will

Like the

German

idealist

in the Ion}’

mn."

m

philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Fukuyama

hypothesized that ideas precede being and consciousness eventually serves as the
determinant of material conditions. History (with a capital H)
contradictions and conflict

end

state

of

human

social

between ideas

and

in a

political order

is

driven by the

process that progressively moves toward an

which contains no

inherent internal

104

contradictions.

Fukuyama summarized

102

Fukuyama

his

neo-Hegelian philosophy by staling

1989, 3-5.

103

Ibid., 4.

104

Ibid., 4-9.
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that the

end of

l<b

History meant that “all of the really big questions had been settled.

settling

of

all

the “big questions”

was achieved within

Prussian government during his lifetime; for

liberalism as expressed in the late 2()

Certainly,

Fukuyama saw

the

lh

For Hegel, the

the very limited liberalism of the

Fukuyama,

was

the end state

classical

century Western world.

ascendancy of classical liberalism

in relation to the

slow collapse of the Soviet Union, but he claimed that there were other signs of

primacy visible

to

membership and

any objective observer

He

1989.

electoral pull” of leftist parties in

corresponding increase

in

in

the popularity of

in electoral

pointed to the “declining

Western democracies and a

victories for decidedly conservative parties.

“unabashedly pro-market and

notable in the global

first

anti-statist” polices

economic superpowers. Furthermore,

Fukuyama noted various attempts by

the

same Western

proliferation of

the political

system

that cultivated

consumerism

particularly

moderate

their

106

political

in the first place.

that the

world-wide

Francis

its

power by

Fukuyama, The End of History and

Press, 1992), xii.

Fukuyama

He

staled that

landscape of Asian Tigers such as South Korea;

moreover, consumerism had begun to truly assert

106

rise

Western consumer culture indicated the seemingly inevitable victory of

consumer culture changed the

105

The

and Marks,

leftist parties to

Fukuyama argued

addition to the shifting political winds,

was

like Lipset

policy platforms with the hope of regaining popular support.

In

liberal

1989, 10.

56

the Last

infiltrating the ancient

Man (New

York: The Free

China by

culture of

According

17

the late 1980s."

to

Fukuyama, History’s end would

not bring about an

immediate

millennial transformation. Actually, he expected that the world would remain quite a

dangerous place with part of the

international

community

living

under post-Historical

conditions and part under Historical conditions. He predicted continued
ideas that

terrorism.

were remnants of the

Historical world,

strife

caused by

namely wars of national liberation and

108

Exceptionalism

On

the surface

it

is

American Exceptionalism.
as a product of the

West

in

Fukuyama

difficult to perceive the

Alter

all,

Fukuyama

connection between

Fukuyama and

consistently refers to classical liberalism

rather than an exclusive possession of the United States.

foundation of his philosophic inquiry (Hegelianism)

of the examples he cites to support

is

decidedly European as are

his assertion that History has

come

to an end.

The

many
So,

given these particulars, the logical question becomes: where does one find the connection

between Fukuyama and American Exceptionalism?
I

in

two

believe that the connection between Fukuyama and Exceptionalism can be found

places.

can be found

First,

in

it

exists as a subtext throughout

the response to

Fukuyama from

In their brief critique of the affect of

Fukuyama's argument. Second,

it

leading conservatives of the day.

American Exceptionalism on the teaching of

Ibid., 18.
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Haberman and Adrian Shubert pointed

history, British historians Arthur

to the effect that

They

often unspoken exceplionalist assumptions have on American intellectuals.

stated

that the:

was Hegel. The end of European history
for the United States is the United States, not as it was or came to be, but as it
wants to have been and wants to be seen. European history is studied as a prelude

end of history

someone

for Hegel,

to the leadership of the world

Haberman and Shubert

In short,

Fukuyama speak about

said,

by the United States.

cautioned that

109

when American

intellectuals like

the importance of the West, they often really

States as the culmination of Western civilization.

Literary historian Brook

Thomas noted

1

mean

1(1

this

nuanced connection between

Fukuyama's theory of History and American Exceptionalism. He asserted
Fukuyama’s argument adds

a

Exceptionalism. For him

world

over

is

(F)or

new

the United

that:

of American

twist to the celebrations

the United States' difference with the rest

of the

Fukuyama American values have triumphed around

the

1

globe."
Journalist and historian Godfrey

Hodgson echoed

a similar sentiment calling

Fukuyama's
ip

work American Exceptionalism

109

was “dressed up

that

resuscitated Hegelianism."

in a

Arthur Haberman and Adrian Shubert, "American Exceptionalism and the

Teaching of European History," American Historical Association,
http://www.historians.org/Perspectives/issues/2006/0609/0609vie .cfm.
1

1

10

In the next section of this chapter,

overtly stated by Samuel Huntington
1

1

Thomas Brook, The New

in his

will

discover that this implication

Clash of Civilizations theory.

Historicism

(Princeton: Princeton University, 1991),
112

we

and Other Old-Fashioned Topics

x.

Godfrey Hodgson, “New Statesman

Profile: Francis

Statesman, http://www.newstatesman.com/20020422001
58

1

Fukuyama,"

New

is

Indeed,

the

Fukuyama himself explicitly mentioned

the United States (as opposed to

West) as the prime mover of the world-wide transformation to classical liberalism.

First,

he extolled the United Slates for being the first to achieve a “fundamentally

Second, Fukuyama also credited the United States

egalitarian” and “classless” society.

with establishing and spreading a

consumer culture
1

the triumph of classical liberalism.

working

its

we should

democracy

is

way through humanity with America as

becomes something
in

that

his theory,

critiqued

Irving Kristol, often described as the

Fukuyama’s

113

Fukuyama

thesis

but a universal idea
1

15

In the

hands of

American Exceptionalism

community

regardless of

mores and material conditions of existence.

focus placed on the United States in the response of

intellectuals.

exceptionalist than the

world carrier?”

its

addition to the subtextual implications within

In

a sure sign of

rhetorical question as

American idea

can be exported to the world

culture, social

same

more American

really not an

Fukuyama and those who were inspired by

differences

ask the

Abbott: “what could be

belief that the triumph of

marked

14

Given Fukuyama’s position,
political scientist Philip

that he believed

Fukuyama, we can

one of

see a distinct

his fellow conservative

founding father of neoconservatism,

on the grounds that the declaration of a definitive victory for

1989, 9.

114

Ibid., 10.

115

Philip Abbott,

Political Science:

An

Science Journal 32,

(

“Redeeming American Exceptionalism

/

Redeeming American

Analysis of Judith N. Shklar’s Presidential Address,” Social
1995), in

Academic Search Premier (accessed August

59

10,

2004).

classical liberalism

Fukuyama
is

it

we have

all

opposed

much

haste.

He

however,

did,

to generic

liberalism and anti-capitalism.”

1

Fukuyama
Western

interpret

United States of America

that the

been wailing for (emphasis added).”

clear that he concurs with

civilization" (as

far too

job has been done and

as claiming that “the

the incarnation

makes

was made with

110

In fact, Kristol

as far as the superiority of “American

civilization) over “various

forms of

anti-

17

KristoFs commentary opens a

window on

were perceived by his contemporaries. Even

if

the

manner

in

Fukuyama was

which Fukuyama's

ideas

not implying that the

United States was the logical conclusion of Western civilization (which seems quite
unlikely), his essay

was

certainly received in that spirit

by many of

his conservative

colleagues.

The Clash of Civilizations and American Exceplionalism

Much

like

Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington wrote an essay from

political perspective that

like

attempted to attach meaning to the post-Cold

Fukuyama, Huntington's essay caused a Hurry of

following

its

110

Irving Kristol,

in

Foreign Affairs

“Responses

to

in

117

Ibid., 28.

60

world. Also

“The Clash of

1993. Three years later he expanded this

Fukuyama,” The National

1989, 27.

War

intellectual discussion in the years

publication. Huntington’s original article entitled

Civilizations?” appeared

a conservative

Interest

.

Summer

initial

piece into an entire book on the same subject.

In

contrast to the unabashed optimism perpetrated by Fukuyama, Huntington's

analysis of the

emerging world order

disconcerting for those

who presumed

prospects of lasting peace.

1

10

In

aftermath of the Soviet collapse was quite

that the

end of

In fact, lie criticized

harmonious world paradigm”
guide.”

in the

that

was

the

Fukuyama

developing a “one

“far too divorced from reality to be a useful

warned

that

such discordance could escalate into major

wars unless his warning was heeded by the leaders of key

nation-states

around the

120

In spite

upon

for

contrast to Fukuyama’s “illusion of harmony,” Huntington envisioned the

definite potential for conflict and

globe.

Cold War would bring

of the differences between him and Fukuyama, Huntington also draws

a foundation in

American Exceptional ism

civilization in the post-Cold

exceptional ist stance

1

War

in the final

world.

More

to help formulate his analysis

of Western

particularly he displays a distinctly

chapter of Clash of Civilizations as he attempts to

ls

Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996). It should not go unmentioned that both
Huntington and Fukuyama attached a question mark to their now renowned articles
(possibly designed to spur discussion) but eliminated the question mark when they
expanded their ideas into a full-length book (possibly designed to signal the culmination
of the discussion).
119

Huntington 1996,

32.

61

develop a comprehensive prescription

for a safer

s1

world order

in the 21

1

century.

"

1

Clash of Civilizations

Huntington's Foreign Affairs

develop a paradigm

that facilitates

states in the aftermath of the

the

fall

Cold War also meant an end

decisive shift

in

cause of conflict

and subsequent book represent an attempt to

our ability to understand the relations

among

nation-

of the Soviet Union. Huntington claimed that the end of

to the strict bipolar

arrangement

in

foreign affairs and a

focus away from political ideology and towards culture as the primary

in the

global arena. In short, the almost fifty year rivalry between the

two superpowers was “replaced by
Huntington was careful
likely

article

to

“remain the principal actors

the clash of civilizations.

’

"

proclaim his presumption that nation-states would

in

world

affairs.”

However,

lie

expected the actions of

national leaders to be guided by the motivations of the dominant civilization within each
.

1

country.

23

Huntington defined “civilization”
recognized by humans

in their social relations.

“language, history, religion, customs,

The

as the highest level of cultural identity

For him, civilization

institutions,

is

defined by

and by the subjective self-identification

doctrine of American Exceptionalism

is

new ground for Huntington.
Huntington, American Politics:

His most explicitly “exceptionalist” work is Samuel P.
The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge, MA: Belknap

not

Press, 1981

).

In this

book,

Huntington explores the disconnect between lofty American ideals and the mundane
institutions of American politics, which often do not live up to the admirable ideals
espoused in the American Creed.
122

123

Huntington 1996, 13-14, 21 and

28.

Ibid., 21.

62

r

i

ii

1

ol people.

By

24

this definition, a civilization is the

by people living

ultimate extended family that

sum, Huntington asserted that those

same broad

recognized

various societies. All those within one’s civilization are considered

in

part of a large, distinct, yet personally distant, kinship

In

is

civilization feel a sense

who

bond.

identify

125

themselves as

part of the

of commonality with and empathy for one another.

These sentiments are important because they make cooperative action more likely among
the nation-states of each civilization.

According

to

126

Huntington, civilizations do not have impermeable boundaries or

specific origins, but they

do

“rise

and

fall”

civilizations also evolve over the course

and “merge and divide." He claimed

of centuries of

human

that

1-7

history.

Huntington both began and concluded his book on civilizations with the

somewhat paradoxical claim below. Untangling the two parts of the following statement
will provide us with a

key

to

understand Huntington’s thesis:

clashes of civilizations arc the greatest threat to world peace, and an international order

124

Ibid.. 43.

125

Ibid., 20.

Within the book, Huntington

is

not explicitly clear about the precise

number of civilizations in the world today. In various parts of the book, he places the
number at 7, 8 and 9 (26 and 29). On a world map (26), he identifies the following
civilizations: Western. Latin American, African, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Orthodox,
Buddhist and Japanese. At another place

in the

Buddhist and Orthodox (45-47).
126

Ibid., 28.

127

Ibid.. 44.

63

book, he repeats the

list,

but excludes

based on civilizations
First.

is

the surest safeguard against

Huntington stated

different civilizations.

that values

world war.

and morals differ greatly

Because of the profound differences

expected that conflict was

likely

Huntington did not necessarily posit

mores, he

own

order.

between civilizations was a

In fact,

he stated that people

cultural identity are assisted

somewhat by defining

themselves as the antithesis of their perceived enemies. Therefore, an “other”
for the

complete development of

self

Huntington’s second point

is

awareness within a civilization.

more

that cultural differences facilitate conflict

difficult to discern.

among

that share

"

that this conflict

War world

post-Cold

attempting to understand their

in cultural

would be high among nation-states

geographic proximity, but arc guided by different cultures.

in the

among people of

between countries of different civilizations. He

particularly anticipated that conflict levels

negative tendency

“

is

essential

130

Even though he claimed

different civilizations,

Huntington

asserted that a global order built upon the recognition of civilizational differences offers

the potential for stability. Such stability

of each civilization

is

only possible, however,

reject the notion of universalism

and

when

resist the lure

the core states

of intervening

in

the affairs of nation-states from other civilizations.

Huntington’s prescription

128

Ibid., 13

129

very reminiscent of the paleoconservative tendency

and 321.

Ibid.,

28-29.

Ibid..

20-21 and 129.

130

is

64

in

American

that

Essentially, his thesis can be reduced to the vulgar altitude

political thought.

people with contrasting identities should “keep to their

Huntington's solution for peace in the post-Cold

War

own

kind.” In sum,

world proposes a system of

development of pockets of

regional isolationism that

would

nation-states lied together

by mutually beneficial alliances but permanently separated

from the remainder of humanity.

facilitate the

like

minded

131

Exceptionalism

in

Huntington

The Decline of Western Civilization
Huntington’s perspective on Western Civilization's place within the global milieu

toward another facet of his thinking; a facet that contrasts with Fukuyama,

clearly points

but, in

its

own

right, is rooted in

an exeeptionalist perspective. Like Fukuyama,

Huntington focused on the role of Western civilization in the post-Cold

He

stated that

as the central

each “civilization secs

itself as the

that this

was

its

history

particularly true for

132

The pretentious belief that Western history

Ml

global order.

center of the world and writes

drama of human history;” he asserted

Western civilization.

War

is

akin to

human

history should

come

am using the term paleoconservative as a means of
American version of classical Burkean conservatism.
Paleoconservatives in 21 century America often consider themselves ideologically
different from the neoconservatives that dominate the current Bush White House,
particularly in matters of social policy. However, paleoconservatives also tend to differ
In this dissertation,

I

defining a particularly

s1

with neoconservatives on foreign policy. Paleoconservatives generally espouse a rigid

espouse an aggressive internationalism.
Examples of paleoconservative thinkers would be Pal Buchanan and Robert Novak.
isolationism while neoconservatives tend to

132

Ibid.,

54-55.

65

as

No

no surprise to anybody.
of

ability to influence all

its

other civilization

known

to

humankind possessed

fellow civilizations as completely, effectively and,

the

at

times,

devastatingly as Western civilization did during the twentieth century. Huntington

the point that the

West remained

early years of the post-Cold

in

made

a position of considerable dominance well into the

War era. 133

Unfortunately for proponents of Western global dominance, Huntington predicted
that the

West had reached

same time

that

the pinnacle or

was reveling

it

in its

its

power and was

victory over Soviet

likely

on the decline

Communism. To make

at

the

matters

i|

is
.s

0

worse lor the West, Huntington repeatedly claimed that the global clash

ol civilizations

/j

\
fc>

could reasonably be reduced to a singular competition between “the West and the rest”

3
#4

l

with particularly sign

i

1

icant challenges

on the Asian continent.

In direct

1

coming from

the Islamic world and civilizations

4

contrast to

Fukuyama, Huntington did not

celebrate the dissolution of the

Soviet Union as the ultimate and final victory for Western morality over contrasting

values nor did

lie

claim that the end of the Cold

War

signaled the

Western preeminence. Rather, Huntington stated that the Cold
exhaustion of the West as the preeminent civilization

in the

dawn of an

War contributed

world.

Ibid., 81,

183-184 and 304.

134

Ibid., 29, 54,

82-83, 102, 183-185 and 209-213.

135

Ibid., 82.

66

to the

135

Moreover, Huntington cautioned that other dominant civilizations

133

era of

in

human

T]

history wrongly imagined that their era represented the culmination of history. Not only

did

all

previous declarations of the end of history prove

to be

wrong, hut Huntington

further points out that such pronouncements often came alter the civilization

had already begun

1

its

decline relative to other cultures.

While Fukuyama asserted
Western culture was poised

to

in

question

*’

Western influence was destined to grow and

that

become

the global culture, Huntington

claimed

that

attempts to “Westernize” competing civilizations by establishing a universal civilization

would

likely be perceived

by the

rest

of the globe as imperialistic. Furthermore, he

posited that such arrogant and clumsy attempts

at

dominance could lead

to a

major

conflagration that might accelerate the decline of the West. Huntington suggested that
leaders of Western nation-states should refuse to give

fundamentally part of Western

The United

States: the

the messianic

in to

1,7

Epitome of

the

the

West

two thinkers

is

United States has been the standard bearer of Western

Ibid.,

many, but one

301.

183-184 and 211.

67

that since

World War

II,

the

civilization; he further stated that

yet be the savior of Western civilization

Ibid., 58. 66,

are

their belief that the United States represents the

culmination of Western civilization. Huntington asserted

America might

that is

culture.

The differences between Fukuyama and Huntington
commonality between

impulse

in

the post-Cold

War era

as long

as

its

leaders heed his foreign policy advice.

s

1

Huntington's prescription for curbing the deterioration of the West

comprehensively exceptionalist

in nature.

He

called

upon leaders

in the

is

United States to

once again embrace “principles of the American Creed." By now. the core tenets of

canon should

ring familiar to us; Huntington parallels the Exceptional isls that

before him with his

list

of core creedal values:

“liberty,

came

democracy, individualism,

equality before the law. constitutionalism, private property.”

In the final

this

1

™

chapter of his book, Huntington’s focus turns abruptly

foreign policy and towards the domestic debate over culture.

He

away from

asserted that

multiculturalism represents the most profound threat to the West because

it

directly

challenges the elemental nature of the American Creed. The proper response to this
threat,

according to Huntington, was the reaffirmation of the American Creed within the

United States and a defense of the core principles of that Creed against the perceived
destructive influence of multiculturalism. “Rejection of the Creed," Huntington

“means

the end of the United States of

the West.

America

as

we have known

it"

warned

and also the end of

140

Huntington's affirmation of exceptionalist principles
reminiscent of Lipset than Fukuyama.

1.18

Ibid.,

83 and 306-7.

Ibid.,

305.

Ibid.,

306-307.

119

140

He

is

is

somewhat more

adamant about the appropriateness of the

68

American Creed

for the

United States and the suitability of Western culture for the

nation-states of the West;

however, unlike Fukuyama, Huntington

is

equally unyielding

about the need for the countries within Western civilization to resist the urge to force

upon other civilizations. For Huntington, neither the American Creed

their core tenets

nor Western civilization

is

superior to the fundamental values of other civilizations.

Basically, Huntington

culture”

is vital

for the

concluded

that

“maintaining the uniqueness of Western

continued existence of Western civilization, but those same

cultural standards are completely inappropriate to

others have their

own

cultural

inappropriate for the West.

to maintain

its

141

mores

impose upon

that are appropriate for

Huntington's suggestion, then,

others.

Western

contrast,

them and completely

is

for

America and

exceptional (in this case, read unique) position in the

forestalling the decline of

By

the

West

world as a means of

142

civilization.

Enemy Mine
In his critique

tendencies

lie

of Huntington,

to

El-Din Aisha explains the exceptionalist

found within the “Clash" thesis.

Exceptionalism can best be found

According

Emad

in

Aysha asserted

that Huntington’s

these rarely discussed domestic policy prescriptions.

Aysha. Huntington articulated the “Clash” theory for the purpose of

preserving social cohesion and cultural homogeneity within the United States by positing
“others” as the implacable enemies of the Western tradition.

141

Ibid.,

310-311.

Ibid.,

318.

142

69

Whether they

are the

product of reality or myth, the hope

was

that the challenge

posed by such

relentless foes

would unite the citizens of the West (particularly the United States) by encouraging them
to identify closely

Of course,

with the similarities between

foreign enemies will respond to

against the United States in a similar fashion.

but

Aysha noted

them and

their fellow compatriots.

American posturing by mobilizing

This poses a potentially dangerous

On

balanee, the incentive to

participate in civilization disputes is greater than the threat; the

unity

is

In the

at

home

next chapter,

post-September

lh
1

we

world.

face of a threat

in the

from abroad.

will revisit the implications

In the

provided ample evidence of

its

144

its

at

expose the

ability to

the Bridge to the 21

apex during the Cold War. However, the three theories

in

s
'

Century

143

we examined

remained a relevant analytical tool for some scholars

global order brought

Aysha,

144

Ibid.,

1

18-

made

civilizational enemies,

The doctrine of American Exceptionalism seemingly reached

changes

in a

and the West.

American Exceptional ism

it

for perpetuating

of a search for enemies

make

destructive capacity and

vulnerability of the United States

reward

case of the attacks of that day, the threat was

manifest as a small group of terrorists, also seeking to

indicate that

threat,

Huntington was willing to accept the risks of civilizational disputes

that

because they bring with them a corresponding reward.

the “clash"

143

on by the

fall

120 and 125-126.

123-125

70

of Leninism

in the

its

paradigmatic

in this

chapter

who examined

the

Soviet Union. Certainly

of consensus changed somewhat from

the narrative

its

Cold War

roots, hut the

foundational belief that the United Slates represents a unique (Lipsct, Fukuyama and

Huntington) and perhaps superior (Fukuyama alone) polity
tossed into the ashcan of history by intellectuals of the

in

world history was not

late twentieth century.

Lipsct provides us with a comprehensive evaluation of both the long-term benefits

and detriments of our unique

gloomy, but

offers us a

in

particular

still

political patterns of thought.

In a similar vein,

Huntington

clearly cxceptionalist analysis of the future for United States

and Western civilization as a whole. Both Lipsct and Huntington approach

the subject of

American

cultural superiority with caution and both also express concern

over the powerful messianic tendencies that seem to be an

Exceptionalism. As

we move

into the twenty

will certainly revisit the potential

first

century

integral part of doctrine

in the

of

subsequent chapter,

we

downside of these two aspects of American

Exceptionalism.

As

for

Fukuyama

(at least the early

1990s version of Fukuyama), he offers us an

unapologetic defense of American and Western superiority as well as an impenitent

messianic mission to spread the seed of Americanism around the globe
of the Cold War.

As we proceed

into Chapter Four,

we

Fukuyama does

confidence

American superiority and

the vision

in

made

not quite

public by Bush

in the

fit

the aftermath

will find the clearest

between Fukuyama’s End of History theory and the cxceptionalist
Bush. While

in

comparisons

rhetoric of

George W.

the standard neoconservative mold, his

his near evangelical zeal are strikingly similar to

days following the attacks of September

71

1

1,

2001.

CHAPTER 4
BUSH, SEPTEMBER
In this chapter,

wc

will

I™ AND AMERICAN EXCEPTION ALISM

1

examine

the rhetoric

explain the terrorist attacks of September

1" 1

to the

1

employed by George W. Bush
American people.

Bush's rhetoric employs many of the Exceptionalist themes

that

We

to

will find that

we have seen

in

previous

chapters.

My

goal

is

to look at the particular language

aftermath of the terrorist attacks.
the

weeks following September

propose

I

1,1
I

1

employed by the president

that the rhetorical

way

deeply impacted the

perceived subsequent military actions taken by the United

show

foundation that

the

States.

the

in

was

laid in

American public
Furthermore,

I

will

that the Exceptionalist nature of Bush’s rhetoric lent additional credence to his

interpretation of events in the minds of

The Power of

many Americans.

Rhetoric

in

Times of National

Most introductory American government
“bully pulpit’’ that

is

times of national

in

power of the presidency both

crisis.

decipher the complexities of foreign

engagement. Considering

September

th
I

1

,

the

textbook discusses the

power of

the

held by the President of the United States. Furthermore, these

texts usually discuss the inordinate

policy and

Crisis

this,

it

is

Historically,

many

affairs, particularly

in the

same

arena of foreign

citizens look to the President to

on matters of military

not surprising that, following the terrorist attacks of

words of George W. Bush

72

figured prominently in the

minds of most

Americans.

145

In its

2004

report on the

importance of what

referred to as “strategic

is

communication,” the U.S. Defense Department provided reinforcement for the idea

most important means of both influencing popular perceptions

presidential rhetoric

is

and crafting support

for administration policies.

the

global strategic communication,

it

While the report focused mostly on

discussed the profound impact that the

President of the United States have on the shaping of
1

that

words of

the

American public opinion on

4,1

security matters.

Northwestern University Communications Professor David Zarcfsky noted that
addition to the prominence of the presidency during times of crisis, the average person

more

likely to be influenced

by persuasive rhetoric from an authority figure

grave insecurity. Regarding the events of September

Americans

internalized an interpretation of the attacks

upon Bush's conlextualization of

York and Washington.

144

lh
1

the events

and

in

I

,

in

in

is

times of

Zarefsky stated that most

which was principally dependent

days following the assault on

New

147

As an example, sec Gary Wasserman, The Basics of American Politics,
(New York: Pearson Longman, 2008), 50-51, 65-66 and 70-71.

Thirteenth Edition
i4(

Defense Science Board, "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on
Strategic Communication, September 2004,” Federation of American Scientists,
’

http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/dsb/commun.pdf.
147

David Zarcfsky, “George W. Bush Discovers Rhetoric: September 20, 2001,
and the U.S. Response to Terrorism,” in The Ethos of Rhetoric, ed. Michael J. Hyde
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 2004), 137-138.
73

Labeling Terrorism an Aet of

War

Zarcfsky asserted that Bush's most impactful rhetorical decision

terrorist attacks acts

was an

to label the

of war rather than something else. Zarefsky's related claim that this

of deliberate planning or calculation”

“instinctive response (and) not the result

somewhat

was

speculative (and questionable), but that
I

does not detract from

his

is

important

.IX

observation on the discourse of war.
)

Transnational Institute fellow Phyllis Bennis concurred with Zarefsky’s assertion.

She

stated that:

i

)
0

The seeming unanimity of calls for war... (occurred)... after hours and days of
hearing from the president and high-ranking officials that only war could answer
such a crime.

0
>
a
3

4

r
-

The

acts of terror perpetrated

by nineteen men, none of

whom

were citizens of

'H

Q

Afghanistan or any of the soon-to-branded Axis of Evil countries, could have been easily

interpreted as a grievous criminal aet instead

of an act of war. Accomplices of the

now

/)

H

*
fei

deceased hijackers could have been investigated, pursued and prosecuted like any other

international criminal.

Labeling the attacks of September

conscious, but certainly not obvious, choice

made by

lh
1

I

as an act of

A>i

war was a

the president and his foreign policy

advisors.

As Zarcfsky accurately noted, important characteristics of an active
were absent

in the

aftermath of the September

1,1
1

1

attacks.

Most

state

of war

notably, the United

l4,s

Ibid., 139.

iJ)

Phyllis Bennis,

Crisis

(New York:

Before anti After:

US Foreign

Interlink Publishing, 2002), 224.

74

Policy and the September

/ /

->

th

Stales

was attacked by

and not by military personnel from

civilian terrorists

a specific

150

nation-stale.

The Taliban government
permitting the terrorist group

in

Afghanistan was eventually

Al-Qaeda

to train

However, no proof was ever offered to suggest

identified as culpable in

and operate within

their borders.

that Taliban officials authorized the

attacks on the United States or participated in the planning of those acts of aggression.

Furthermore, recent history does not appear to support the assertion

paradigm

is

American Timothy McVeigh firmly believed

the United Stales

government when he bombed

City,

OK; however,

by civilian law enforcement

Members of the PIRA
a

in

Irish

151

was

at

war with

Murrah Federal Building

was

his sentence

in

to

carried out

151

the lengthy dispute over the status of captured

Army (PIRA)

in the

1970s and early 1980s.

the custody of British authorities considered themselves soldiers

They repeatedly sought

prisoners or prisoners of war.

150

is

Republican

war against the British Empire and

criminals.

was conducted and

officials, not military officials.

Perhaps a more fitting analogy

members of the Provisional

the Allred P.

that he

he was tried as a criminal and ultimately sentenced

death by a federal court. His prosecution

in

war

ultimately the most accurate lens with which to evaluate terrorist activity by

non-state actors.

Oklahoma

that the

to

bitterly

have

opposed being

their status

In direct contrast to the

treated like

changed

war

common

to that of political

rhetoric of the

Bush

Zarefsky, 140.

Timothy McVeigh, “McVeigh’s Apr. 26

Letter to Fox News," Fox News,

http://www. foxnews.com/story 70,2933, 7500,00. html.
1
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administration, the British government, again and again, refused to grant an exceptional

status to

PIRA members;

instead, they persistently referred to these individuals as

criminals worthy only of prosecution to the fullest extent of the law.

In

these examples from recent history,

we

see

two

global powers defining acts of

violence perpetrated by non-state entities as criminal behavior rather than employing war

terminology.

By

not considering terrorists like

McVeigh and

the

PIRA

as legitimate

combatants, the two powers that were attacked by these non-stale actors denied a level of
legitimacy to their challengers. In

fact,

acknowledged the viewpoint of their

had either the United Stales or Great Britain

attackers, they

would have

effectively elevated these

non-state individuals to a position on par with themselves.

Considering
attacks of

this recent past,

September

people to think
thoughts that

I

I

why was

as the initiation of a state of war? Rhetoric not only encourages

in a specific direction, but

may

the president so adamant about labeling the

it

can also be used

to direct

people

away from

contrast with the overarching message of those seeking to persuade

them.

By discussing
to

the attacks of September

lh
1

l

in the

propose actions that normally would be considered off

as best solved

by international criminal

institutional violence

within a

limits

if

the matter

was

able

were viewed

justice procedures. Particularly, the level of

considered permissible by the populace increases considerably

war context.

Moreover, the rhetoric of war
instantly

context of war. Bush

trumps the idea of framing

is

so unyielding and definitive that

it

almost

the attacks as a criminal act or anything else that

76

qualifies as less than war.

In the

face of the

war

rhetoric, those attempting to

analyze the

situation in a legal context arc seen as offering a feeble response to a brutal incident.

Worse, those who sought

to

employ

a criminal justice lens to evaluate the terrorist attacks

appear guilty of trivializing a confrontation
Zarefsky slated

that “the rhetoric

celebrates national unity.”

power

to craft policies

they can claim that

dissent

is

it

much more

When

tranquil times.”

As we

a nation

is at

is

war,

in the

it

difficult to justify

may

is

it

lost.

"assumes and

easier for those in political

direction they see

if

were

lives

important because

serving the war effort. Also,

the activity of the executive

more

of war"

and allocate resources

is

which thousands of

in

the nation

is

most

fit

us long as

on a war footing,

and even simple legislative attempts to oversee

be dismissed as "luxuries that must await the return of

152

will see later in this chapter, the president

used the war on terrorism as a

validation for the enactment of several policy initiatives in the near aftermath of
lh

September

I

l

.

lack thereof) that

It

is

interesting to hypothesize

about the different level of support (or

some of these measures would have

publicized as part of the war

received had they not been

effort.

Exccptionalism and the Rhetoric of

The rush
was almost

152

to both label and understand the attacks of

War

September

th
1

as acts of

certainly impacted by exceptionulist motivations on the part of the

Zarefsky, 140.
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war

American

president. Furthermore, the

Americans

same

for the

Law

Yale

1

Hongju Koh

stated that:

brought upon the United States, like Achilles, a schizophrenic sense

1

exceptional power, coupled with

its

its

exceptional vulnerability. Never has a

superpower seemed so powerful and vulnerable

posed by the Bush Doctrine
•

superpower resources

because

it

to protect

moment of collective

appeared

to

enemy who wounded
the United States

is

twice and stare

the country so severely.

down

overwhelming power

As

humankind”
will

is

its

September

economic and

to fight

back

an

at

that

it

it

Germany

could unquestionably use

its

enemy who exposed American

1'\
1

International Relations Professor Barry

special because

which

moment of national weakness,

crumbled, then

completely annihilate an

vulnerability so completely on

war surely resonated

United States could defeat imperial

the Soviets until they

to

best to use our

Twentieth century history informs us

prosecuting war. At a

to think that if the

how

our vulnerability?

vulnerability, the rhetoric of

at

is

1

be an explicitly proactive position from

outstanding

was surely consoling

same time. Given that we
in the war against terrorism,

the

at

have already suffered some 3,000 civilian casualties
the question fundamentally

At a

many

reason.

Professor Harold

September
of

war rhetoric was likely received positively by

Buzan noted,

political values are

the “idea that the

US

is

destined to shape the future of

reinforced by the fact that the United States has been able to enforce

its

around the world for many decades. Buzan further argued that over time, the

I

Harold Hongju Koh, “On American Exceptionalism,” Stanford

(2003): 1497.

Law Review

55

unrivaled strength of the United States

becomes

the hallmark of our Exccplionalism and.

moreover, a good to be defended against any and

The unipolar world

Communism and

1,1

September

1

1

challengers.

154

deeade between the

that existed for the

the attacks of

all

fall

of Soviet

only further reinforced the idea

that the

United States was exceptional (in this case read both superior and unique). The logic to
support this deduction

history,

how

is

else could

simple: If United States

America reach such

way of thinking and

has a special right, above

all

not a unique country in world

historic heights as a nation-state?

Because many Americans arc convinced
and superior

was

living, they arc

that the United States possesses a unique

more

other nations, to protect

easily convinced that the country

its

exceptionality by any means

necessary. Therefore, threats arc exaggerated in the minds of citizens, actual events are

seen as

more cataclysmic, and, of course, the domestic population does

disproportionate responses by their

own

country as terribly inappropriate.

Given these exceptionalist impulses,
sizeable portion of the

not perceive

it

is

155

completely understandable

that a

American populace readily accepted Bush’s determination

attacks ushered in a state of

war between

the United States and the

all

who

that the

plan or

support global terrorists acts. Furthermore, exceptional beliefs encourage the popular

sentiment that anything less than placing the country on a complete war footing
represents a negligent and unacceptable response by

IM

Barry Buzan, The United States

Twenty-First Century (Cambridge,
155

Ibid.,

UK:

and

American

the Great Powers:

Polity Press), 155.

172-173.
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officials.

World

Polities in the

Exceptional ist Language in Bush's

As

early as the evening of

September

the terrorist attacks not only as an act

forces of

Office,

good and

Bush

In the

evil.

said that not only

1

1

,

War

Rhetoric

2001 George
.

W. Bush began

of war, but the beginning of a

introductory

comments

battle

to his address

were individuals assaulted earlier

to

frame

between

the

from the Oval

that day, but

“our way
1,1

of

came under

our very freedom

life,

attack.”

Bush continued with

the statement that

'

)

"America was targeted for attack because we're the brightest beacon lor freedom and
I

opportunity

in the

world.”

156
I
a

From

his earliest

pronouncements on the matter. Bush treated the following

0
ij

S
*

baseless assumption as

if

it

were irrefutable truth - war was declared upon the United

:a
“ut

4s

States of

America because of

its

As Zarefsky

distinctive freedoms.

noted, in addition to

were acts of war. Bush also presumed

the assumption that the terrorist attacks

attacks were specifically designed to target the

that the

United States as a nation-state and

r

^

*

that the

l

reason for targeting the United States

is

that

America

is

the epitome of the thing that the

'jjjj

attackers hate

at the

-

freedom and

Bush established

all

three ol these rhetorical points

very beginning of the crisis and never publicly waivered

were “incontrovertible

It

attack

liberty.

is

from the position

157

facts.”

entirely possible,

and even

likely, that

Bush was correct

in

considering the

was focused upon the United States as a nation-state. Over a year

’

157

that all

after the terrorist

Bush, “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation.”

Zarefsky, 142.
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<*

attacks of

the

September

American public.

specifically targeted

future attacks

I

1th,

Osama

bin

bin

In that letter,

and

Laden was

In this letter,

bin

Laden made

that terrorist forces

on the United States and

credited with writing a letter directed to

under

it

his

clear that the United Slates

command were

contemplating

'

its

citizens.

Laden also mentioned numerous reasons

The reasons

launched against the United States.

was

listed,

for the hostile acts

however, were mostly worldly

grievances linked to the behavior of the United States and not related to accusations
associated with abstract concepts such as freedom and liberty. Instead of discussing the

American penchant for freedom, he cited grievances against U.S. policy toward
Somalia and Iraq; he also alluded to American support
served the interests of the

in the letter that

West over

could conceivably

the needs of their

come

Of course,

this letter

is

by no means

has not been firmly established;

Osama

bin

Laden or one of

it

is

for dictatorships that allegedly

own

American

The only

authoritative.

his close followers.

its

We

is

a brief

I5y

The

Moreover,

claims.

issue raised

culture.

quite possible that this

have no means to verify the veracity of

people.

close to referring to “our freedoms”

diatribe in opposition to the libertine nature of

Palestine,

authenticity of this letter

letter

if

was not even

the letter

very well

may

is

written

genuine,

we

by

still

be examining a

prime example of counter-rhetoric on bin Laden's behalf. He may have been recruiting
for

Al-Qaeda by calling attention

l>s

Osama

to causes that

would most

bin Laden, “Full Text: bin Laden's

'letter to

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/nov/24/thcobserver.
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likely appeal to the

Arab

America', " Guardian (UK),

Slrcct.

In

any case,

this letter gives us, at least, an opportunity to consider bin

mindset and his motives independent of Bush's

rhetoric.

American or Western

the top of his

considered a priority

The idea
September
advisors.

lh
I

1

at

minds of the nineteen September

in the

American freedoms were

that

is little

indication that

of grievances or

list

1

I

l"

hijackers.

the primary motivating factor for the

attacks appears to be the creation of George

W. Bush

or

one

Nevertheless, Bush's rhetoric resonated with many Americans

immediate aftermath of September
In the

to

were

political liberties

There

promote

remainder of

his three

Furthermore,

I

will

Americans because

1

main assumptions
that

in

his close

the

l"’.

this section,

propose

Laden's

we
is

will see that the language

deeply rooted

in

employed by Bush

American Exceptionalism.

Bush's assumptions may have been accepted by

large portions of the

American public

many

also believe the Exceptionalist

myth.

Freedom under Attack
In his

September

I

1th

remarks, and

in

many

other speeches immediately

following the terrorist attacks. Bush cited American freedom
for the terrorists

included, but

who

was not

attacked the United States. Specific commentary to this effect

limited to the following statements: “freedom and

under attack,” the implication

we “embrace freedom,”
faceless

as the motivational target

cowards upon

that the people

democracy

are

of the United States were attacked because

the reference to “the heinous acts of violence perpetrated by

the people and freedom of the United States” and the quote that

“(t)hey have attacked America because

comment, “freedom” was framed
independent entity

that

is

are freedom’s

that bears little

1

Peter Slevin suggested, the details of freedom

simply

left to the interpretation

of the listener.

define

was

it

set apart as an

this

term an abstract and

resemblance to any tangible material conditions.

fact, as

However one may

manner;

In the last

'’ 11

word freedom makes

the

home and defender.”

particularly unusual

uniquely American.

Bush's rhetorical use of

symbolic construct

in a

we

it,

when

it

used

is

In

context are

in this

161

the operational

meaning of the term freedom does not

have any impact on Bush's overarching point. Rather the concept of freedom seems

to

serve as:

a political device

word

as well as a

as shorthand for

as an argument-stopper.

If

we

look

at

if,?
"

Bush's usage of the term freedom using the lens of American

Exceptionalism as our mode of analysis,

160

source of moral authority. (Bush) invokes the

American values as he defines them, and treats the concept

we might conclude

George W. Bush, “Remarks by

that his extensive

the President in Photo

and

Opportunity with the

National Security Team,” The Whitehouse,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200 /09/200 09 2-4.html; George
1

“Remarks by

the President While Touring

Damage

1

1

at the

W.

Bush,

Pentagon,” The Whitehouse,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/rcleases/2001/09/ 200109I2-I2.html; George W. Bush,
“Honoring the Victims of the Incidents on Tuesday, September 1, 2001,” The
Whitehouse, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200 09 2- .html;
George W. Bush, “President's Remarks at National Day of Prayer and Remembrance,”
1

1

1

1

The Whitehouse, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200 1/09/200 09 4-2.html.
1

161

Peter Slevin, "The

Word

at

the

1

White House: Bush Formulates His Brand of

Foreign Policy," The Washington Post, June 23, 2002, B01.
162

Ibid.
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abstract use of this

word allowed the president to tap into deeply held assumptions

are shared

by many Americans. Freedom,

beyond the

rights of political participation

in this

rhetorical sense, takes

and procedural

plethora of nation-states around the globe. Rather,

that

is

it

liberties that

In

accordance with

this

on a meaning

can be found

far

in

a

takes on a metaphorical meaning

independent of specific material conditions. Freedom,

symbolize a uniquely American way of

that

context,

in this

comes

to

life.

perspective, those outside of the United States

possess certain mundane aspects freedom, such as the

power

may

to participate in

governmental decision making or the protection of a considerably broad slate of positive
and negative

liberties.

However, freedom

in its

purest and noblest form

is

exclusive to

the Unites States of America.

Such

a rhetorical construct separates the material

philosophical underpinnings

the

in

meaning of

a fashion reminiscent of the Platonic

Forms were knowable by only

a select

follows that the United States would be

in

sole possession of

nation-states merely possess various vestiges of

Good
Much

Bush claimed

that

lh
1

l

like

.

Bush informed us

own

in his

Forms. For

Based upon

its

Plato,

this logic,

Freedom, while other

freedom but not bona

fide

Freedom.

versus Evil

freedom, the word “evil" quickly

as his

word from

few philosophers; the remainder of the

population could never acquire genuine knowledge of the Forms.

it

the

became another

rhetorical construct

address to the nation on the evening of September

that earlier that

day “our nation saw

evil."

In total, the President

made

four allusions to the term evil in his short speech that evening.

The day
freedom and

opposed

after the terrorist attacks.

evil to

Bush coordinated

of both the constructs

begin rallying citizens around his plan for a military response

response - see the previous section).

to a legal

his use

163

First.

Americans were

(as

told that

“(f)reedom and democracy are under attack.” Then, they were advised that the enemy of

freedom “hides

enemy and

good

the

shadows” and “preys on innocent and unsuspecting people.”

we were informed

Finally,

this

in

that there

that this battle

would be an upcoming

would “be

a

monumental

military

struggle of

engagement

good versus

against

But

evil.

164

will prevail.”

By using concepts such
attacks as the

first

salvo

in

as freedom and evil. Bush effectively framed the

an apocalyptic conflict. This conflict was presented

terrorist

in

almost

terms - the battle would be between the forces of freedom and good on one side

biblical

and the forces of evil on the other.
In

165

subsequent comments. Bush continued to effectively use the term

anyone even remotely associated with the

terrorist attacks.

Bush used the

evil to define

label

“evildoers” to define both the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks and their supporters

164

is

Bush, “Statement by the President

in

at

His Address to the Nation." The speech

only 594 words long.
164

Security

Bush, “Remarks by the President

in

Photo Opportunity with the National

Team.”

165

See

also.

Bush’s conclusion to his remarks on the evening of September

lh
I

l

“go forward to defend freedom and all that is good and just
He stated that America
our world.” Bush. “Statement by the President in His Address to the Nation.”
will

85

.

in

all

He informed Americans

levels.

that all evildoers

must be “punished severely," and

apparently indiscriminately, because the “enormity of their evil demands

The impact of the above
-

a proclamation for a National

played a dual role

-

rhetoric

Day of

political leader

amplified by the context

is

Prayer and Remembrance.

and religious

leader.

In this

in

100
it.”

which

it

appeared

In this milieu.

Bush

capacity he attempted to

join together the denunciation of the terrorists as evil with the implication that divine
)

must be sought by those who

retribution

“in the face of

remain strong

all this evil

*

and united"

107
i

a

o

In the

days following the

terrorist attacks,

Bush remained on message, repeatedly

o
s

*
1

claiming that the attacks of September

I

l"

signaled the

commencement

of a cataclysmic

3

&
L

battle

between good and

evil.

At the same time,

lie

continually restated the assertion that

n
0

retaliation

conflict.

was not only justifiable,

Specific

commentary

but a moral requisite given the epic nature of the

to this effect included, but

was not

limited to the

4

*

i
i

following statements: “our responsibility to history

is

already clear: to answer these
V

attacks

and

rid the

world of evil," “(w)e

doers have never seen the

will rid the

American people

out” and his statement that those

who

in

world of the evil-doers,” “the

action before

they're about to find

offer “safe havens" for the “evil-doers" “will be

100

of the

evil-

George W. Bush, “National Day of Prayer and Remembrance
Terrorist Attacks on September 1, 2001,” The Whitehouse,
I

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010913-7.html.
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for the

Victims

10 *

held accountable.”

The dramatic dichotomy presented
to take seriously unless

Bush's rhetoric on good and evil

in

in

global affairs.

United States simply has not been an unflinching force for goodness

it

assumed

As Zarefsky
suspend

my

is

Cold War.

a comfortable

answer

The

world,
169

end

to

promise of a definite reward for doing so.

to the

deeply disturbing question -

why was

170

the attackers are evildoers, then the population subjected to the rhetorical

argument can more

many ways

the forces of-evil are diametrically

if

world: and evil attempted

s

own minds

easily reconcile in their

the reason for the devastating

and

inexplicable terrorist attacks. Such an argument proceeds in the following

concise manner:

l,

in the

claims, such language encourages those on the receiving

county attacked by a cadre of foreign invaders?
If

in

the mantle of superpower during the

their ability to think critically with the

The remuneration

difficult

one maintains a romanticized and truly exceptional perspective

on both American history and the position of the United States

especially since

is

to attack the

opposed

to the forces

most obvious source of good

in

of good

in the

the world;

Day of Prayer and Remembrance;”
George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President Upon Arrival,” The Whitehouse,
http://www.whitchouse.gov/news/relcases/200 1/09/200 109 16-2.html; George W. Bush,
“Guard and Reserves ‘Define Spirit of America’,” The Whitehouse,
Bush, “President’s Remarks

at

National

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109 7-3.html.
1

109

The

list

of sources on

this matter

convenient quick reference guide
twentieth century
since World
170

War

is

II

is

overwhelming. Perhaps the most

to the exertion of U.S.

power

in

the second half of the

William Blum, Killing Hope: U.S. Military and CIA Interventions

(Monroe, ME:

Common

Courage Press, 1995).

Zarefsky, 143-144.
87

there lore the attacks can he explained as part of a dual istic struggle well

beyond

the

control of the average citizen.

Psychology Professor John Edwards asserts that the

terrorist attacks

human beings

shocking and devastating for reasons beyond the large number of
that fateful day.

The

attacks also struck at the heart of

fact that nineteen citizens of

on

underdeveloped countries could expose the weakness of the

lh
1

killed

American’s national pride. The

United States was humiliating for the collective consciousness of America.

The pre-September

were

l

hubris of

U.S. citizens

were under

as quickly as the physical structures that

a flawed belief in the absolute nature

many

assault.

American security was

was
It

in

171

violently deconstructed

is

very probable that such

some measure supported

by a frame of mind deeply influenced by exceptionalist assumptions. Seemingly, only

someone with

a definitive belief of the inherent greatness

could reasonably believe

that their nation-state

as the one launched on September

Bush's good versus
of the America public.
nothing but the most

was immune

to a devastating attack

l'

.

plays directly

at

the

damaged

collective psyche

perpetrators that attacked the United States

evil intentions, then

goodness and righteousness of

such

h
I

evil rhetoric

If the

and superiority of their country

possessed

such as heinous only reaffirms the intrinsic

the United States. Therefore,

even

at

the height of our

national weakness. Americans were experiencing the reinforcement of exceptionalism

courtesy of the rhetorical positions taken by our leaders.

171

John Edwards, “After the

Fall,"

Discourse and Society 15 (2004): 162-163.

Values
Bush’s rhetorical claims about freedom, good and evil were further reinforced by
his

subsequent declaration that the terrorists “don’t share the same values that

The non-descript nature of the term values
to

anything specific.

discussion of values
1

time.

Much
is

like the other

in

we

share.”

the previous statement likely does not refer

terms examined

an abstraction that can

in the

mean anything

previous sections, the

or nothing

at

the

same

~>
1“

However,

if

one scrutinizes

this

language using an exceptional ist perspective such

arguments about values become very meaningful. Most of the theorists examined

in the

previous two chapters posited the existence of an established set of values often referred

to as the

American Creed. For those who adhere to

this philosophy, the

American Creed

defines the unique values of a unique culture.

The values contained within the American Creed almost take on an existence of
their

own; they are abstracted from any material definition

removed from

their origins.

Minor disagreements over

immaterial, rather defense of the

familiar

way of thinking and

any given time and also

the specifics of the Creed are

Creed becomes an indispensable

in

dispute between America and

enemies, Bush proclaimed that the terrorists “hate our values

172

Bush, George

part of maintaining a

living.

Without specifying the particular values that are

its

at

W. “Remarks by

the President

Pentagon.”

89

(and) hate what

While Touring Damage

at

the

America stands

173

While lacking any means

for."

the ability to contribute to the creation

for verification, such a statement has

of an irresolvable dichotomy between Americans

and the Other. The Other, of course, possesses nothing

common

in

with the good,

freedom loving people of the United States. Citizens convinced of the existence of a

Maniehean schism could more easily be swayed

to support an extensive militaristic

response to an attack such as the one perpetrated against the United States on September

1

1th.

The discussion of conflicting core values,
abstract use of concepts like

freedom seemed

to resonate within the

The message delivered by the president did not only
American

citizens, but

it

In

number of

conservatives such as

polity.

intellectuals

who, early

by George W. Bush.

February 2002, sixty academics signed onto an open

auspices of the Institute for

American

the

affect the mindset of average

also influenced a significant

on, publicly supported the actions taken

dichotomy and

the good/evil

American Values (IAV). The

Fukuyama and Huntington;

the

list

letter drafted

under the

signatories included notable

also included intellectuals from

elsewhere on the ideological spectrum such as Robert Putnam, former Senator Daniel
Patrick

Moynihan and noted

173

“just

war"

theorist Michael Walzer.

George W. Bush, “President Pledges Assistance
The Whitchouse,

for

174

New York

in

Phone Call

with Pataki. Giuliani,”

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/200109 3-4.html.
1

174

American Values, “What We're Fighting
for American Values,

Institute for

America,”

Institute

http://www.americanvalues.org/html/wwff.html.

For:

A

Letter from

Significant portions of this letter read as

speeches. The

IAV

to

letter extolled

the planners of the September

1

1

employed by

that drafted this letter.

If so,

wholesale, from Bush

way of

something

lh
1

l

were

living.”

that is “attractive, not

only

world.” Finally, the signatories state that

in the

attacks represented a “world-threatening evil that

clearly requires the use of force to remove

rhetoric

as

lifted,

of September

society, our entire

American values

Americans, but to people everywhere

The

they were

letter clearly asserted that the attacks

launched as an assault against “our overall
Furthermore, the

if

175

it.”

the president

may have

influenced the esteemed group

the scope of the impact that Bush's persuasive rhetoric

on American society extended beyond average

citizens

had

and included certain intellectual

elites.

We can

find four clear hallmarks of

arguments of the president

in the

aftermath of the September

excessive statements on the cataclysmic
Lipset's

comments regarding

strictly dualistic

the

American Exceptionalism

battle

in

the rhetorical

th

attacks.

1

between good and

Bush's more

evil lead us to recall

Manichcan nature of exccptionalist thinking. Bush’s

conception of reality possesses a strong religious component. Intense

religious zeal, including the messianic search for perfectibility,

is

a second characteristic

of exceptionalism as discussed by both Boorstin and Lipset. Third, we find
rhetoric the effective definition of an other

to the

American Creed. Huntington argued

whose value system
that unity at

91

is

in

Bush's

diametrically opposed

home can be

reinforced by

rallying against a foreign other

from our own. Finally,

in

whose

political

Bush's arguments we find an appeal to irrationality that

who

reminiscent of Hartz’s irrational American

in their entirety but

and cultural mores are vastly different
is

adheres to certain ideological constructs

appears only to partially understand the complexity of those

constructs.

1

submit

above qualities

that the existence of the

in

Bush’s argument indicates the

presence of a dominant exceptionalist narrative within his rhetorical position on the

contemporary

War on

Terrorism. Furthermore, Bush’s early success

in

crafting public

opinion suggests that exceptionalist tendencies seemingly contribute to shaping the
political thinking

of

many members

The Use of Rhetoric

As days passed

into

of the American polity.

to Build

Support for Changes

weeks following

consistent rhetorical posture. Repeatedly,

Public Policy

in

the terrorist attacks.

we

find

him alluding

Bush maintained

to the

a

key concepts of

“freedom,” “good/evil,” and “values.” The constant repetition of the same rhetorical
position

process.

was seemingly designed
Built

likely to

have a profound impact on the public policy making

upon the foundation of Bush’s

actual policy initiatives.

more

to

rhetorical statements

his

number of

proposals into law.

Because there were serious policy implications linked

to

these troubled times are worth examining

in presidential rhetoric.

a

Those influenced by the president's arguments would surely be

consent to the passage of

made by Bush during

were

Specific

to the following statements

commentary

which

all

them, the statements

beyond a simple exercise

to this effect included, but

came from

the

same speech:

“all

was

not limited

of a sudden, some

came and they declared war on America,” "(we) want

evil

people

we

face, the

campaign

to protect

freedom” and reference

compassionate people, a land

who wants

stands solidly on principles

the principles of freedom.”

--

to help a

mighty land, a land of

to “a

neighbor

in

to talk about the battle

need, but a land

170

Bush focused a great deal on the concept of freedom during
a joint session of

Congress on September 20, 2001

.

who

During

his historic address to

that speech, he also

began

connect proposed policies to his rhetorical concepts. For example, to defend freedom,
are told that the United States

“with

It

will not

reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”

Lost

among

we

needs to embark upon a “war on terror” which would begin

Qaeda, but... not end there.

al

to

the thunderous ovation

end

until

every

terrorist

group of global

177

which followed

recognition that the President of the United States

the above

comment, was

the

had just announced the beginning of

what promised to be a long and protracted war that would likely extend

far

beyond

geographic boundaries of Afghanistan and the political boundaries of the war powers
granted by Congressional Resolution on

later in the

170

same speech,

it

September

2001. As Bush, himself, admitted

remains unlikely that the ambitious goal of defeating

all

global

George W. Bush, “President: We're Making Progress,” The Whitehouse,
/
0/200 00 -6.html.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/200
177

14.

1

1

1

1

1

Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People.”

Commentary on freedom included, but was not limited to the following statements:
“Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom,” “On
September the 1th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our country”
and “Freedom and fear are at war. The advance of human freedom — the great
achievement of our time, and the great hope of every time — now depends on us.
1

93

terrorists will

be fulfilled during his presidency or anytime

in the

near future for that

I7S

matter.

Not only did Bush announce the United States involvement
he

demanded

has a decision to make. Either

His famous quote "Every nation,

you are with

received a resounding round of applause

lengthy war, but

around the globe join the struggle or

that all other nations-states

labeled supporters of terrorism.

in a

us,

or you are

w ith

from the assembled

in

risk

being

every region, now

may have

the terrorists”

officials, but

it

is

difficult to

defend such a statement rationally unless one’s subject audience has already been

convinced that one side of the dispute

is

unimpeachable good and the other side

completely correct and represents

is

utterly incorrect

and represents unmitigated

179

evil.

In

addition to the

announcement of a permanent

slate

of war against a non-state

enemy. Bush also used the occasion to usurp Congressional authority by creating
Office of

Homeland Security (OHS), an
The announcement of the

bureaucracy.

unilaterally

named

determined that the

a person,

OHS

entirely

OHS

new

was

a

entity within the federal

sweeping policy move

would enjoy “cabinet

former Pennsylvania Governor

Tom

level" status.

•

in

which Bush

Bush even

Ridge, to head the operation before

Congress had the opportunity to create the office by legislation

7X

the

in

accordance with the

•

•

Resolution to Authorize the use of United States Armed Forces
Against Those Responsible for the Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States,
1

Public

Ibid; Joint

Law
I7C)

107-40,

I

15 Stat.

224 (2001).

Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People."

94

dictates of our constitutional system.

It

is

1X0

understandable and perhaps even expected

that the chief

executive authority

within a nation-state will react quickly and decisively to an urgent situation such as the
attacks of September

1

l"\

What

is

would assume such absolute power
the

unexpected

for the

would hopefully extend beyond

need to defend “America’s freedom” from

Only days following

that the President

of the United States

to act without either waiting for authorization

Congress or presenting justification

justification

is

from

enactment of emergency powers. Such

simplistic rhetorical allusions such as the

the forces of evil.

1X1

Bush again employed the

his Congressional address.

rhetorical constructs of “freedom,” “good/evii.” and “values" to justify proposed policy

changes
In his

that

speech

gave the executive branch more authority
at the

FBI headquarters on September 25

enforcement” must have “the
terrorism.

The necessary

to track calls

when

lh
.

war on

terror.”

the President stated that

“law

tools necessary” to be effective in their efforts against

tools for law enforcement included granting the

(suspected terrorists)

authority to hold suspected terrorists

they're deported.”

to prosecute “the

make

who

calls

from

different

FBI the

“ability

phones” and “the

arc in the process of being deported, until

1X2

iso

Ibid.

ISI

Ibid.
1X2

George W. Bush, “President: FBI Needs Tools to Track Down Terrorists,” The
Whitehouse, http://www.whitehousc.gov/news/rcleases/200 1/09/200 10925-5.html.
95

Rather than defend these proposed powers on their merits, the president justified
his request

September

with a slew of claims that were consistent with his rhetorical position since
lh
I

.

l

Specific

commentary

to this effect included, but

was

not limited to the

following statements:

The people who did
are evil people.

this act

They

on America, and who may be planning

don't represent an ideology, they don't represent a

legitimate political group of people. They're

about,

is

evil.

And

further acts,

as a nation of

we're going to find them, and

we

good

flat evil.

That's

all

they can think

folks, we're going to hunt

them down, and

1X3

them

will bring

to justice.

Also,

America

is

of freedom.
fight.

This
„

unique.

a nation built

And
is

upon freedom, and

via the passage of the

passed

The

—

blink from the

made

USA-PATRIOT

series of

amendments

Bush

referred to

Act.

For the most

USA-PATRIOT

in

the

us

above speech were granted

part, the

USA-PATRIOT

Act

to existing surveillance laws, particularly the

in

1978.

Act were often glossed over by

The
its

specific changes

supporters and the

near record time considering the typical glacial speed of the U.S. Congress.

in

title

will not

a nation that will stand strong for the great values that have

Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act initially passed
offered by the

—

184

Eventually, the necessary tools

was a complex

the principles of freedom, the values

this is a nation that will not

of the legislation,

itself

(Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing

184

Ibid.

184

Ibid.

96

bill

Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism), was a testament to the
influence of the cxceptionalist rhetoric

At the signing ceremony
sure to include

in the

for the

commentary regarding

aftermath of the terrorist attacks.

USA-PATRIOT

Act on October 26

the moral status of those

and detained under the many provisions of the new piece of

“we've seen

the

enemy

Of course,

They recognize no

the text of this

new

legislation.

legislation did not

discretion, further limited cheeks

list

“immoral

Act.

He

stated that

evil

doer” as a
Act.

The

act

upon the presidency and challenged

Amendment

rights for

alike.

Perhaps there was a good reason for

USA-PATRIOT

Bush made

be surveilled

USA-PATRIOT

the established equilibrium between public safety and the Fourth

both citizens and non-citizens

.

barrier of morality.”

prerequisite for one to be subjected to the particulars of the

expanded executive

who might

lh

One could

instituting the particular provisions

of the

argue that the extraordinary events of September

lh
l

1

required an unusual and temporarily domineering response from the government.

However,

the possibility that a rational argument might have led to the passage of the

lss

and Strengthening Ameriea by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act, Public Law 107-56, 15
Stat. 272 (2001 ); The Federal Judiciary, “Understanding Intelligence Surveillance: A
FISA Primer,” U.S. Courts, http://www.uscourts.gov/outreach/topics/fisa/whatisfisa.html;
Center for Democracy and Technology, “Setting the Record Straight: An Analysis of the
Justice Department's PATRIOT Act Website,” Center for Democracy and Technology,
Uniting

to Intercept

1

http://www.cdt.org/security/usapatriot/031027cdt.shtml.
IX(
’

George W. Bush, “President Signs Anti-Terrorism

Bill,”

The Whitehouse,

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/2001 1026-5.html.
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USA-PATRIOT

Acl does not contradict the evidence that indicates that a rhetorical

position, not an intellectual position

In the

promote
the

his

weeks following

economic policy

He

as a

more stimulus

available.

1

l

4,

2001

it's

to

While speaking

terror.”

at

Bush discussed the economic impact of the

,

it

was

the time to be wise.

We need for

Bush even attempted

.

component of the “war on

yesterday the Secretary of Treasury and

added).”

lh

September

stated unequivocally that

not the time to be timid,

why

day for the Bush Administration.

the

the attacks of

Department of Labor on October

terrorist attacks.

won

1

It’s

also the time to act.

both said that

there to he

more

we need

And

that's

have
(emphasis

tax cuts,

to

187

Tax cuts had been

a major

component of George Bush’s economic policy since

the beginning of his campaign for the presidency.

His support for tax cuts

with and justified by his economic philosophy. However, here

language of the “war on

terror” and not the

we

see

was consistent

Bush using

the

language of supply-side economics to

rationalize the call for an intensification of a policy that he supported long before the

attacks of September

Bush

lh
I

I

.

certainly tried to convince the

American people

inexplicable reason, necessary to win the war on terrorism.

legislation, if passed,

would “make sure freedom stands,

children and grandchildren,

live in a great land

187

and

in a

we were

that tax cuts were, for

He claimed

some

that the tax cut

to rout out evil, to

say to our

bold enough to act, without tiring, so that you can

peaceful world.”

88

Bush, George W. “President Unveils Back to

98

Work

Plan.”

Here

we

sec

Bush using the rhetoric of the war on terrorism

just foreign policy decisions, but also to

policy agenda.

if

one concedes

represented an extraordinary

was successful

in

moment

that the

in

more than

promote an important component of his domestic

The impact of such discourse on

important to note even

to affect

overall policy

days following September

American

achieving policy objectives

domestic policy suggests that his rhetoric

making success

in

is

lh
l

I

history. Finally, the fact that

Bush

both the areas of foreign policy and

may have had

a significant impact on the public

discourse.

A Reason

to

be Concerned over the Impact of Exccptionalist Rhetoric

Many American

citizens

were encouraged to support

specific policies of the

Bush

Administration not because the president’s arguments were consistent and rational, but

because he used his bully pulpit to successfully tap into the collective subconscious of

this nation

during a

moment of

approach to the war on terrorism
tendencies of

Bush appeared

intense crisis.

in

a

many Americans. His

manner

to

frame his rhetorical

that appealed to the Exccptionalist

policy proposals exploited American’s

held beliefs; the fundamental rationale behind his exceptionalist claim

was

commonly

that

extraordinary measures were needed in extraordinary times to defend an extraordinary

polity

from an assault perpetrated by an extraordinary

Some might

consider the events of September

example - an outlier event

that

of exccptionalist rhetoric upon

was certainly shocking

evil.

1,1
1

1

and

their aftermath an

extreme

cannot accurately yield important findings on the impact

American

to citizens

politics.

The carnage wrought by

of the United States and people

99

all

the attacks

around the globe.

Perhaps

this is

perhaps there

to operate;

acts

an outlier event from which there

of aggression.

is

It

is

no frame of reference

is

simply no logical explanation

for

Americans

to offer for these devastating

possible that the president and his closest advisors, surely

shock themselves, reached into their bag of rhetorical tricks and pulled out the
they got their hands on.

was

which

first

was no other reasonable manner

there

in

above caution holds some relevance; the attacks were

unquestionably overwhelming to the collective American psyche. Nevertheless,

mind

in

that the use

of Exceptionalist rhetoric

policies, including military

be positive.

is

it

to discuss the attacks.

Certainly, the

keep

thing

the Exceptionalist rhetoric, as fantastic as

may have been employed because

times,

at

The war analogy and

in

A

careful

to

we must

manufacture support for various

engagement, has a long-term impact

examination of the rhetoric employed

in

that

the

may

not necessarily

immediate aftermath

essential because of the potentially devastating effect that subsequent polices

may have

had on citizens of the United States and citizens of the world.

Seven years
in

after the attacks

of September

two undeclared wars of occupation

the

world are strained to near

soldiers in the

1

89

in

the

maximum due

lh
1

l

,

the United States

Middle and Near
to these

East.

Our

is

forces around

two military campaigns and

two war zones are serving long and often multiple tours of duty.

New

York Times

Loss Practice In 2008,”

.

1

the

w

Thom Shanker, “Pentagon Considers Adding Forces
May 3, 2008; Associated Press, “Army Won't End Stop-

Steven Lee Meyers and

Afghanistan,”

over-extended

CBS News.

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/22/national/main4033774.shtml.

100

in

burden placed upon our military forces, the cost of the two

In addition to the

occupations

is

mounting.

estimated that the

Blimcs and

final cost

March 2008,

professors Linda Bilmcs and Joseph Stiglitz

of the Iraq war alone would top the three

summarize

Stiglitz

expect to spend that

home.”

In

this point perfectly

much money “on

a failed

by stating

that a nation-state

war abroad and not

mark.

trillion dollar

feel the

cannot

pain at

190

Moreover, the reputation of the United States appears

to be suffering

around the

world. Nation-states from around the world elicited a great deal of genuine sympathy

toward the United States

in the

French journalist Jean-Marie Colombani summed up
around the world had

famous quote “We

for the United States on

are

all

lh

immediate aftermath of the September

Americans!

We

are

l

attacks.

the feelings of solidarity that

September

all

1

New

12,

2001

Yorkers."

.

many

She wrote the now

191

Unfortunately, the reputation of American seems to have been sullied over the
past seven years by the policies enacted by the Bush Administration.

obvious by now

that the

world does not see us as we see ourselves.

It

On

is

painfully

the whole,

citizens of other countries do not appear to regard Americans as liberators and fighters for

freedom. Ostensibly, the United States
or negative by

many and

is

considered to be something

much more

potentially dangerous and detrimental to the cause of

neutral

world

peace by some around the globe.

190

Linda

Cost Us $3

J.

Bilmcs and Joseph

Trillion,

and

E. Stiglitz,

“The Reckoning: The

Much More," Washington

101

Post,

March

9,

Iraq

War

2008, B01.

Will

Unilateral action, preemptive war, extraordinary rendition, torture and the

permanent holding of certain foreign

nationals as

enemy combatants

few of the

arc only a

polices that resulted from the Bush administration's quest to protect “our freedoms” via

the

war on

terrorism. These policies have not been

welcomed by

the

community of

nations-states around the globe. Furthermore, these actions have led to a loss of the trust

in

The good

the United States.

of September

lh
I

l

will

has been frittered

toward America that was so apparent

away because of policies

that

in

the aftermath

might not have been

necessary but for our collective myopic world view.

The Purpose of this Critique
This

critical analysis

lh

September

I

l

can serve as a springboard

general and the Iraq

War

into presidential rhetoric,

narrow focus upon

1

how

to

the

have endeavored,

broader critique of the Bush Doctrine

for the

most

terror

is

in

part, to sustain a relatively

maintain this particular focus because

war on

of

However, for the purpose of the specific inquiry

in particular.

I

to a

terrorist attacks

the period immediately following the attacks of

have opted

to understand

of Bush's rhetorical approach to the

I

September

believe that

it

discussed within the American polity.

is

I

th
1

1

.

essential

am

confident that a better understanding of how average citizens have been spoken to by
their leaders

themselves

191

and how these same citizens discuss issues of war and peace among

will

make

a small contribution to a

Jean-Marie Colombani,

“We

Arc

All

more sophisticated understanding of the

Americans,” Le Monde, September 12,

2001.
192

Nat HcntolT, “Getting our Reputation Back,” Village Voice, January, 22, 2008.
102

current state of foreign affairs for three

First,

means

to

presidential rhetoric

major reasons.

on any subject should be

examined

as a

discourage attempts on the part of our chief executive to obfuscate the

inconsistencies in his or her policy formulation

example of a significant

shift in

reconcile. This inconsistency

rhetoric of the

is

criticized his

and implementation. Peter Slcvin

Bush's foreign policy priorities

more

war on terrorism. Back

George W. Bush

difficult to

in the

evaluate

2000

defense polices.

In

if

one

that

is

is

cites an

difficult to

completely sold on the

presidential campaign, then-candidate

opponent Al Gore and the Clinton administration

focus on the practice of “nation building" and their

critical

critically

downplaying of traditional

for their

strategic

103

recent years.

component of

Bush has made the mission of spreading procedural democracy

his foreign policy strategy.

the goal of building a functional

Apparently, between 2000 and

democracy

as a

By

the

2004

election.

major justification

2004 he abandoned

a

Bush was touting

for the

war

in Iraq.

his strong objections to the practice of

“nation building.” However, he has yet to articulate the specific rationale for such a

drastic

change from

his original foreign policy leanings.

104

Second, the president's rhetoric must be examined critically because

193

194

it

encourages

S levin, B01

Among

George W. Bush, “Remarks by President Bush and Senator
Kerry in the First 2004 Presidential Debate,” The Whitehouse,
http://www.whitchoLisc.gov/news/releases/2004/10/20041001.html and George W. Bush,
“Remarks by President Bush and Senator Kerry in the Third 2004 Presidential Debate,”
The Whitehouse, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ncws/releases/2004/10/2004 1014-1 .html.
others, sec

103

Americans

to adopt a

United States

in the

shallow and simplistic approach to understanding the place of the

Bush's rhetorical stance allowed him

global political order.

to

American foreign policy with meaningless statements

address international opposition to

such as the one below:

(W)hcn sec that in some Islamic countries there is vitriolic hatred for
America? I’ll tell you how respond: I'm amazed. I'm amazed that there is such
misunderstanding of what our country is about, that people would hale us.
am,
am - like most Americans, just can't believe it. Because know how good we
I

1

I

While the attacks of September

some voices well beyond

the

lh
1

were wholly and completely

l

narrow confines of radical Islam

America represented an illegitimate means

to address justifiable grievances against a

to agree with these detractors to realize that

guilty of

affairs

is

it

is

One does

implementing a self-serving foreign policy.

World War,

not need

not rational to instantly dismiss criticism

on the grounds that America

Since the end of the Second

unjustified,

assert that those attacks on

country that posits itself as the supreme and unilateral world power.

levied against the United States

is

too good and noble to be

196

the record of the United States in global

complex. During the second half of the twentieth century, the United States

earned the praise of

l9>

some

in

the global

community and

the legitimate condemnation of

George W. Bush, “President Holds Prime Time News Conference,” The

Whitehouse, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/2001 10
196

See particularly

Noam Chomsky,

9-11

(New York: Seven

Stephen R. Shalom, “Confronting Terrorism and War,”

and Kathleen Christison, “The 9/1

I

1

I

I

Report and

Its

New

I

-7.html.

Stories, 2001

);

Politics Winter 2002; Bill
,

Weak-Kneed Consensus,”

Counterpunch, http://www.counterpunch.org/christison07272004.html.
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1

others.

To

provide for true security, U.S. foreign policy makers and the American people

themselves must,

at least,

recognize the existence of these complexities.

Third, the rhetorical patterns used by President Bush must be critiqued because

such absolutist discourse can lead
practically

any action taken by

to the justification for

this

and the popular support of

government, so long as

it

can be associated with the

preservation of “good” and the defeat of “evil." As James Carroll notes:

What

is

permitted to be done

in

the

name of ridding

allowed? Torture? The killing of children. ..the
ot dubious wars?

the

world of evil?

Is

lying

militarization of civil society?

The launching

Since September 2001, the United Slates has had

to address serious

regarding torture, extraordinary renditions, the compromising of civil

emptive war. Each of these issues along with other concerns

that

questions

liberties

and pre-

stem from the war on

terrorism are truly controversial questions that should be debated intelligently rather than

settled with platitudes containing absolutes about “good” and “evil."

IM7

James

Carroll, "Bush’s

War

Against Evil," Boston Globe, July
105

8,

2003,

A 18.

CHAPTER

5

WHITHER EXCEPTION ALISM?
In the

previous chapter,

to the terrorist attack of

However,

discourse.

if

we saw

September

lh
1

l

that the

Bush Administration's rhetorical reaction

was very much

the discourse surrounding

with exccptionalist

in line

September

lh
I

exccptionalist,

is

l

is

it

not quite the traditional exultant exceptionalism of Hofstadter, Boorstin and Hart/,.

International Relations Professor David

Slates

era.

now

is

MacDonald

experiencing a “new form of exceptionalism”

MacDonald claimed

and triumphalisl

for the

that “traditional

most

asserted that the United

in the

post-September

,h
I

l

forms of exceptionalism have been positive

part,” with the United Stales cast in the role

of the noble

and strong leader of the world. The “new form of exceptionalism,” MacDonald notes,
portrays "America as a vulnerable and persecuted target of globalized and irrational
hatreds.”

198

The
the

attacks of September

overwhelming

1,1
1

were obviously disturbing and painful because of

loss of life; they also represented a traumatic collective

because they exposed American vulnerability. The
direct assault

Moreover,

V)S

marked

the first

on the American homeland by an outside enemy since the British invaded

the United States during the

1

terrorist attacks

experience

this

War

of 1812.

enemy was something beyond

David MacDonald, "America and

and the Righteous Victim" (paper presented
Studies Association, Chicago,

IL,

the
at

New

foreign

- it

also lurked in the

Exceptionalism: The

the annual

War on

Terror

meeting of the International

United States, February 28, 2007),

1.

shadows. The
military force

men on

the world could not

in

a suicide mission.

face of an

and the most technically sophisticated

largest nuclear arsenal in history

enemy

The United

for the first

This position

is

defend the United States homeland from nineteen
States

was exposed and appeared helpless

time since the early decades of the Republic.

contrary to the mythology surrounding the victorious and

dominant United Stales of the twentieth century. During World
myth, the United States reluctantly stepped up and lent
before returning to

The myth
giant

is

its

own hemisphere

in the style

picks up a few decades later during

forced from

its

in the

World War

I,

according to

this

might to the cause of freedom

its

of the

War

Roman
II

general Cincinnatus.

w hen, once

again, a reluctant

slumber by a sneak attack. After securing freedom for the second

time, the giant remains on the scene, not for

its

own

benefit, but only to defend the hard

earned freedom from yet another dangerous foe.

There

is

one glaring constant throughout this questionable telling of history - the

United Slates

is

depicted as strong, victorious and beneficent. Placing

role of the victim

Americans

who needs

are familiar

being attacked struck

Yet, the

to disengage

at

its

is

simply not

in the

part of the script with

which

and comfortable. John Edwards states that the humiliation of
the heart

September

from

help from others

America

1

l"’

of our exceptionalism.

attacks,

no matter

how

lw

devastating, did not lead America

historic exceptionalist self-identity.

Simply, Americans collectively

absorbed the feelings of victimization into their political discourse and did not allow

lw

Edwards, 162.

107

this

change to prevent them from feeling special and

drastic

from the remainder of

set apart

the world.

In fact,

Americans continued

to feel privileged

and superior

all

other countries; so

superior that they were collectively convinced that their country should have a free hand

to confront

Paul

and destroy the dark forces behind the September

lh
1

attacks.

l

McCartney claims, “the American people desperately needed

and purpose reaffirmed after suffering 9/1

Of course,
the unrivaled

in

’s

champion of

liberty

No

the world.

matter

If

the United States

anyone who would seek to do

campaign against the
without

much

evil

restraint

is

it

have

their

goodness

200

mindset portrayed the United

States, as

and freedom. Yet another important component of
is

if

the belief that the United States

the actual historical record

is

is

this

a constant source

much more mixed,

many Americans view

myth provides the dominant lens with which
disputes.

senseless onslaught.”

the prevailing exeeptionalist

dominant twentieth century myth
of good

1

to

As Professor

the

foreign policy

considered the quintessential example of good, then

harm must be the root of all

evil.

For many, the

ones was something that needed to be fought vigorously and

on the part of the U.S.

The leaders of the United States sought and were granted permission by the
collective consciousness of the

American citizenry

standard rules of international engagement.

200

to seek “justice”

Such regulations were

unburdened by the

crafted for others,

“The Bush Doctrine and American Nationalism" (paper
presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston.
MA, United States, August 28-September 1, 2002), 25.
Paul McCartney,

108

who
in

are not as obviously

the

days following the

good

as the United Stales.

terrorist attacks

American Exceptional ist thought among

A
Some might
patterns

is

The prevalence of the above

a clear testament to the resilience of

is

the citizens of the United Stales.

say that the staying power of American Exceptionalist thought

the hallmark of our true exceptionalism. Several authors

which looks or has looked upon
era,

that their

itself as a

unique

Germans, Japanese and Britons

(to

entity.

name

is

From time

a few)

all

between these nations and America

is that, at

some

in the

chapters

not the only polity

to time, in the

held strong to the belief

respective cultures and societies were unique and superior

difference

201

Contrasting Theory to American Exceptionalism

above, most notably Lipset. acknowledged that the United States

modern

attitude

to all others.

The

point, the populations in

each of these countries were disabused of their claims to superiority and possibly even
their feelings

of distinctiveness.

material conditions

By

contrast,

paradigm

became incapable
Americans appear

uniqueness and superiority
contrary.

A

As discussed

in the

in the

shift

occurred

in

these nations

when

ol sustaining such philosophical arrogance.

to stubbornly maintain a collective sense of both

face of practically any material conditions to the

above section, American Exceptionalism has proven

thoroughly adaptable and self-reinforcing paradigm over the years.

201

~ ~

" '

McCartney, 38.
For a comparison between American Exceptionalism and “Japanese

Uniqueness,” see Lipset 1996, 21 1-266.
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to be a

As

Lipsct and

Marks

asserted, there

Exceplionalism. Exceptionalism
reinforcement of a

set

in the

is

nothing magic about American

United States

is

simply a foremost example of the

of political norms within a specifically defined people. During the

course of two centuries, norms developed within the American
these

norms had

last

in

subsequent generations. By implication, this cycle

forever until something atypical disrupts the pattern of reinforcement
2(13

from one generation
In his

to the next.

recent book. Blessed

Among

noted that “the workings of history tend
...(e)xcept for the

to a national

United States - so

myth too long

204

York:

of the world, but

Hill
205

it

04

However, Rauchway asserted

that since material conditions

1

that clinging

milieu.

He

no longer support

superiority “the habit of being unusual

is

Jb
fallacies.

can easily be applied

th
1

Rauchway

disabuse people of their national myths...

thesis primarily concerns the United States

post-September

203

to

American uniqueness and

Rauchway’s

in the

,

detrimental to the development of a nation-state.

is

leading Americans into unfortunate

vis the rest

Nations history professor Eric

far.”"

concluded his book with the observation
the existence of

developed,

a profound affect upon American institutions. In turn, the institutions

influenced the adoption of norms

can potentially

polity; as they

to

economic position

vis-a-

our discussion of the United States

Unlike most writers on the subject,

Rauchway argued

Lipsct and Marks, 265.

Eric

Rauch way. Blessed Among

and Wang, 2006),

Nations:

167.

Ibid., 172.

110

How

the

World Made America (New

that

American Exceptionalism began, not with the Puritans or the Framers but with the

Industrial Revolution.

For him, the

critical

time period between the end of the Civil

great hallmark of this era

environment of relative

moment

War and

in

the

American development was

beginning of World

War

was rapid industrialization and economic expansion

isolation

Rauchway claimed

The

I,

in

an

from the other developed countries of the world.

that the

the

206

United States, during the end of the nineteen century

and the beginning of the twentieth century, reaped the tremendous benefits of massive

amounts of foreign

capital investment

further staled that at the

mostly within

its

the building of an

own

and a large influx of cheap immigrant labor. He

same time the United States had the luxury of building an empire

borders.

In

almost neo-Leninist fashion,

Rauchway

asserted that

American Empire on the Western frontier provided incipient capitalists

The

affordable and easy access to both raw materials and markets for finished goods.

United States Army’s subjugation of the native population on the American frontier
required

some

colossal cost

financial outlay, but the U.S. internal

commitment of the empires administered by European nations. By

Europeans were required

to build

Rauchway’s conclusion was

206

207

Ibid., 14-17.

207

that the vast difference in material

American development

Ibid., 10-12.

contrast,

and fund ubiquitous governmental structures to conquer

and maintain far-flung colonies around the world.

facilitated an

empire certainly did not equal the

that

conditions

was dramatically divergent from European

development. Guided by Rauchway’s work and the information provided
chapter,

we

ean offer a developmental theory

in

the previous

American

with doctrine of the

that contrasts

consensus.

The United
central

States did not end up with both a comparatively

government and

who

citizens

government
developed

that

in the

enamored with

was much more

limited

Hartz’s words were “irrational Lockeans"

in

because a hyper-liberal philosophy was an
contrast, both a citizenry

weak and

integral part of the very fabric

the

of society. By

myth of the rugged individual and

limited than any of the

its

counterparts

in

a national

Europe

United Stales because of the strikingly distinct material conditions that

existed during the industrial revolution

in

America.

Surely, the economic factors discussed are not the only dynamic that effected

ideological and governmental development

observations of Tocqueville and

many

in the

United States. The altitudinal

others certainly indicate that there

was something

unique about the socio-political character of the United States before the Industrial
Revolution. For example, decentralizing influences can found
Constitution;

some examples of decentralized elements

balances and the Senate. Part of the reason
States

is

relatively

weak

governmental power

is

Yes, the United States

numerous reasons

is

the United States

include federalism, checks and

that the national

due to the constitutional factors

in the past

in

government

in the

that retarded the

United

growth of

century.

different politically

and socially. Furthermore, there are

for the significant divergence between the U.S. and the rest of the

world. However, Rauchway’s theory helps us to overcome the very attractive, yet

obviously fallacious myth that implies American Exceplionalism

that

could he breathed

in

we found

in

Of course,

the previous statement

is

Hows

somewhat

our examination of the recent history of American
adherents presumed that the Creed had an almost

Exceplionalism, several of

its

supernatural impact on the

American land and people.

Rauchway \s

to a product

through the very air and ingested through the water that

within the borders of the United Slates.

hyperbole; yet, as

was akin

thesis places

American Exceptionalism squarely

in

middle ground

between an unremarkable national narrative that collapses once key material conditions

change and an insuperable meta-theory that continues to exist

in spite

of dramatically

changing material conditions. He stated that while exceptionalist attitudes have served

Americans “noticeably
States have

still

less

well" after

World War

I,

many people

chosen to “cling to their old adaptations

He advanced
indulge themselves

the

in

argument

that

new environments.

contemporary Americans can

little

^08

afford to

such mythology and he predicted that the dominance of the

exceptionalist narrative

would not

last forever.

However, Rauchway appeared

pessimistic about our ability to discard exceptionalism

adopt and paraphrase the words of Friedrich Nietzsche,

that

in

within the United

“American Exceptionalism

is

dead; but given the

20X

Ibid., 28.

1

13

to be

and embrace a new paradigm. To

Rauchway claim

way

is

effectively

of Americans, there

may

still

he caves for thousands of years

have

vanquish

to

We

will

its

shadow, too!"

know

never

moment

an eventful

which

in

its

shadow

will be

shown.

— And we — we

-01

for sure, but

perhaps the attacks of September

which the specter of American Exceplionalism

in

still

lh
I

initialed

I

finally

proved

to

/

no longer be an accurate lens with which to understand the role of the United States
world. Surely, the president used exceptionalist rhetoric as a tool to rally

in the

Americans

around two prolonged military operations that led to two sustained military occupations.

However, more than seven years after the devastating attacks, fewer Americans appear

to

be impressed by the argument that the preservation of our freedoms requires us to fight

One wonders

wars against nation-states accused of terrorist activities.

if

the president

could effectively use the same exceptionalist rhetoric today to justify the initiation of

hostilities

200

somewhere

in the

world.

-10

Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, The Gay
UK: Cambridge University, 2001 109. The
original quote reads: “God is dead; but given the way of men, there may still be caves for
thousands of years in which his shadow will be shown.
And we we still have to

The

original quote can be

found

in

Science ed. Bernard Williams (Cambridge,

),

,

—

—

vanquish his shadow, too!"
210

Gallup

Poll,

“War on Terrorism,” Gallup,

http://www.gallup.com/poll/5257/War-Terrorism.aspx.
questions:

I

)

Do you

think the United States

made a

Of particular

mistake

in

note are two

sending military forces

to

was 93% no and 6% yes: in July
2004. the response was 72% no and 34% yes; in August 2008, the response was 63% no
and 34% yes. While a majority still thinks that the war in Afghanistan was the proper
strategy, the decline in support is significant. 2) Suppose the United States had
actionable intelligence about terrorist operations in Pakistan, and the Pakistani
government was not taking action against the terrorists. Would yon favor or oppose the

Afghanistan, or not? In January 2002, the response

United States taking military action against the terrorists in Pakistan ?

52%

favored the hypothetical action and

expanding the war on terrorism

in this

42%

opposed

it.

In

August 2007,

Again, a majority supported

hypothetical case, but the margin was fairly slim.
1

14

Moreover, one could conclude
paradigm have been a

failure.

that the actions taken based

In a recent

paper delivered

at

upon the exceptionalist

the convention of the

International Studies Association, Didier Chaudct, a research fellow

Institute

of International Relations

the United States

were

( I

FR

1

),

the French

posited that the ongoing hostilities involving

the brainchild of largely neoconservative policy planners in the

Bush Administration who were motivated by

American

influence a majority of

citizens.

the

same

make

at least

exceptionalist assumptions that

Chaudct further claimed

mindset based upon exceptionalist assumptions has
Administration to

at

led decision

two serious miscalculations

that the prevailing

makers within the Bush

in the

planning and

implementation of their war on terrorism."
First,

Chaudct noted

tremendous amount of

By

while the early U.S. effort focused upon Afghanistan, a

this country’s available military capacity and

away from

focus quickly shifted
Persian world.

that

much of the

the “-stans” of Central Asia and toward the

strategic

Arab and

placing the focus on Iraq and Iran instead of Central Asia, the Bush

Administration consciously directed attention away from the supposed prime targets of
the

war on terrorism Al Qaeda and
(

terrorist cells in

undermined

211

212

its

the Taliban).

By

relegating the

engagement of

Central Asia to secondary importance, the administration successfully

own

slated purpose for initiating hostilities

Chaudct, 12-13.
Ibid., 15-17.
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'

in the first

place."

Of course,

there

a strong possibility that such major policy priorities were so

is

easily shifted because they were never genuine from the

claims of former administration

officials

the attack

engagement

upon Afghanistan was

that best

his

fit

If

we can

believe the

such as Richard Clarke, the war against

Afghanistan was not the desired point of conflict for

However,

start.

initiated

the President or his top advisors.

because
21

lh

post-September

1

l

it

represented the military

'

rhetoric.
i

The two wars

currently being prosecuted by the United States

may

best be

I

I

explained as one implemented

to fulfill the rhetorical claims

made by

the president in the

<

I

)

days following the attacks of September

1'
1

I

and another

that strains the rhetoric

of the

)

3

war on terrorism
voices

in

the

but matches the long-term policy plans of the leading foreign affairs

Bush administration.

s

1

1

This conclusion

is

complimented by Chaudet’s second

point.

Chaudet claimed
j

Bush Administration’s neoconservative and

that the

exceptionalist inspired approach to

|

3

the

war on terrorism has simply served

to blur “the debate

on the roots of Islamist
jj

;

terrorism.” Chaudet asserted that after September

1

1" Americans

were “shaken by the

horrible attacks” and “they wanted an answer to the question ‘why do they hate us?’”

Unfortunately, Bush and his primary spokespcople only “gave one wrong answer after
the other.”

“

214

Julian Borger,

“Bush Ignored Terror

Threat, Claims Ex-aide,” Guardian

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/22/iraq.usa.
214

Chaudet, 17-18.

116

(UK),

<

ForChaudct,
those

who

the

“wrong" answers ignored the genuine grievances put forth by

considered themselves to be Islamic nationalists.

He presumed

that as long as

disputes such as the Israel i-Palcstinian conflict remain unresolved, those choosing

terrorism will have a basis to justify their actions, even

pretext hiding their true motivation.

Of course,

the

-

if

merely a

that foundation is

'

“wrong" answers led

to action

- foreign military action and

domestic policing measures were initiated by the United States on behalf of a population
that generally

supported the decision of

of course, played into the hands of those

its

measures

to protect the Islamic Nation.

conducted the “War on Terror"

Muslims.”

in

a

leadership (at least early on).

who claimed

to be

As Chaudct noted,

manner

that

made

it

engaging
the

in

These

actions,

extreme

Bush Administration

“War

appear as a

Against

-16

From an American
Bush Administration

is

perspective, the result of the policy decisions

that the

United States remains hopelessly

immersed

occupation of Afghanistan and the occupation of Iraq. Meanwhile,
self-confessed mastermind behind the attacks, remains free

symbol of Islamic

The

made by

Osama

and continues

in

the

both the

bin Laden, the

to serve as a

nationalist resistance.

exceptionalist assumptions that contributed to the actions taken

Administration have not been reinforced

in the

215

Ibid., 19.

216

Ibid.
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by

the

Bush

seven years since the initiation of the war

17

on terrorism."

Americans

are

Might the growing dissatisfaction with the war on terrorism signal

on

in

a position

where they might accept a new paradigm - one

answer, of course, would be merely speculative, especially considering the

long-term dominance of exceptionalist thinking

ball,

such a radical paradigm shift

is

in the

implemented

in the past

psyche of the policy prescriptions

seven years will likely only be fully understood

generations. However, the possibility of a

if

United Stales. Minus a crystal

impossible to predict.

Frankly, the impact on the national political

time,

that

yoke of exceptionalism?

explains material conditions better than the ideological

Any

that

paradigm

shift is

in

subsequent

worth considering

at this

only to discuss alternative traditions that might rise in prominence over the old

paradigm?

We

will address these

questions

in the final

section of this chapter.

The End of Exceptionalism?
At

September

" l7

this point,

h
1

l'

I

have discussed the impact of exceptionalist rhetoric on post-

America.

In the first

and second sections of Chapter

note are two questions:

Who

5,

1

have also taken

you think is
currently winning the war against terrorism ? In January 2002, the response was 66% the
U.S. and its allies, 25% neither side, and 7% the terrorists; in June 2007, the response was
29% the U.S. and its allies, 50% neither side, and 20% the terrorists. By June 2007, a
significant majority of Americans believed that the war on terrorism was, at best, a draw.
2) How satisfied are you with the way things are going for the U.S. in the war on
terrorism In September 2002, 75% reported that they were either very satisfied or
somewhat satisfied while 24% were either not too satisfied or not at all satisfied. In
September 2008, 52% reported that they were either very satisfied or somewhat satisfied
while 45% were either not too satisfied or not at all satisfied. Seven years after the
lh
September
attacks, Americans were practically split in half over their feelings of
satisfaction with the war on terrorism and the trend was moving toward higher levels of
Gallup

1

Poll.

01' particular

l

dissatisfaction.

1

18

I

)

clo

a look at the possible impact of

Exceptionalism.

ended the previous section with

1

the question,

In his

recent book.

The Limits of Power,

Bacevich answered the above question with a resounding “yes.”

,

from

their

that

In his

1

the

l

manner similar

Bacevich stated
involvement

in

Americans must awake
the United

to other historic empires.

2008, the United States faced the

reality

of

its

inextricable

“an open-ended global war on terrorism.” Furthermore, he claimed

consequence of

our declining

that, in

Andrew

book, subtitled

slumber and abandon exceptionalist patterns of thought or watch

States decline in

the

lh

was September

international relations professor

The End of American Exceptionalism Bacevich asserted

to

the future of American

hurrah” for exceptionalism?

“last

J.

changing material conditions on

this

war has been

economy and

political leadership

its

that

the exacerbation of three related crises: one related

connection to contemporary American

(more accurately, the lack

culture,

one of

thereof) and one involving the deterioration

"'IS

•

of military power."

Of course, Bacevich placed
at

the feet of

a significant portion of the blame for the current crisis

George W. Bush and the “Wise Men” of his

clearly stated that the three-pronged crisis,

which

is

now

administration. However, he

reaching dangerous proportions,

has been plaguing the United States for decades. For Bacevich, the contemporary war on
terrorism launched by the

Bush Administration

in

the

wake of the September

lh
I

l

merely represents the capstone of a series of policy decisions and military actions

~ ls

Andrew J. Bacevich, The Limits of Power: The End of American
Exceptionalism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2008), 1-6.

attacks

that

have contributed to the decline of the United Slates
.

century.

second half of the twentieth

210

Bacevich asserted

two

that

have played an influential role
decades. The

first is

in

particular exceptionalist assumptions and attitudes

making

the mistaken belief

and their nation-state’s military power
perpetuity.

to

in the

The second

is

is

the interrelated crises worse over the past

among Americans

that the

is

preeminent and destined to remain

theirs to rule

that

way

the relentless pursuit of freedom, which has increasingly

be defined as the right of absolute “self-indulgence” particularly

consumerism.

world

few

in relation to

in

come

wanton

220

According

to Bacevich’s argument, these

two assumptions are mutually

aggravating factors and prove harmful to the American body
significant ways.

First,

these assumptions, particularly the

politic in at least four

First,

leave the United States

vulnerable and truly insecure. Second, the relentless pursuit for material happiness and

“freedom” leads to profligate

social behavior.

The

third detrimental effect, closely

ways

related to the second,

is

Finally, the irrational

wants and expectations of the American people

the faulty expectation that our profligate

of a political Frankenstein monster - a bevy of politicians

worse by catering

219

220

Ibid., 5

to the petty

wants of Americans

and 101.

Ibid., 2-9.

120

in

who

are sustainable.

fosters the creation

continually

makes matters

exchange for the privilege of

remaining

in office.

To

fully

understand Bacevich's conclusion, each of these tendencies

require brief examination.

Bacevich asserted

that the attacks

territorial vulnerability in the

belief that the United States

Of course,

was

the

exposed a dangerous

1

in the

main reason for

all

internal defense.

world.

He claimed

that

this strategic vulnerability.

was ultimately secure within

policy shapers to focus practically

globe rather than on

1,1
1

most powerful nation-state

the collective hubris of Americans

The

of September

its

borders allowed foreign

of their efforts on power projection around the
2-1

the preoccupation of

American policy planners with the maintenance

of empire was conditioned by the exccptionalist belief that global domination via the

deployment of either

“soft”

power or

the traditional “hard”

the national destiny of the United States.

Reinhold Niebuhr, Bacevich

Inspired

integral part

of

by the thought of philosopher

criticized this national

fostered a collective sanctimony

power was an

among Americans

arrogance - a

trait that

he claimed

as well as firm belief that the

world

111

should be remade over

in

our image and likeness.

Aggravating the dilemma produced by American’s collective feelings of hubris

and sanctimony

is

the

modern tendency

to

equate liberty and freedom with the attainment

of material comforts. Discussing what he termed “the

22

I

Ibid., 3.
Ill

Ibid., 3-7.
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crisis

of American profligacy,”

Bacevich asserted

becoming more
In

II

era has seen the philosophy of

freedom

America's very consumerist culture, the quest for self-gratification almost

tendency, which

fulfill

War

often dclincd as self-gratification."

always translates

essential

that the post- World

into materialistic desires.

is

According

to

Bacevich, the imperial

already strong thanks to our exceptionalist assumptions,

becomes an

component of U.S. foreign policy as leaders of the American polity seek

the wants and desires of millions of

to

Americans."

For Bacevich, a fundamental dilemma facing the United States grows as the
increasing desire for self-gratification collide with the nation-state’s decreasing ability to

maintain the empire

Bacevich

that

allows for the fulfillment of

stated that while

American

collective profligacy.

American’s collective expectations of material comforts have

increased, their mutual willingness to contribute and sacrifice for the sake of

empire has

ns.

decreased correspondingly."

223

Ibid., 17.

'>14

is the weakest portion of Bacevich's argument.
blame of American profligacy on average Americans.
With only brief and passing exceptions, Bacevich neglects to discuss the role that U.S.
based corporations have played in generating the overtly consumerist culture that
lh
becomes apparent in 20 and early 21 century America. He also fails to note that a
significant portion of the population in our inner cities and rural areas have not
experienced the material benefits of consumer culture to any great degree. Aside from
this note that Bacevich's theory lacks an appropriate class analysis,
will refrain from
arguing this point further so we can get to the relevance of Bacevich’s conclusions and
their impact on the subject of American Exceptionalism.

Ibid., 9-17.

Perhaps this

I

think that he too easily places the

s1

I

122

In addition to the

above tendency, Bacevich claimed

expansionism have increased over the decades since World
that

that the costs

War

II.

In

of

sum, he asserted

by the twenty-first century, the formulaic expectation that expansionism

abundance no longer applies to the American empire.
United States

to cost the

1,1

September

I

1

much more

than

it

In fact,

expansionism

Bacevich explained

yields.

will yield

is

beginning

that the post-

wars did not cause this erosion of American imperium, but they most

certainly have exacerbated

what he sees as the inevitable catastrophe ahead

for the

United

226

States.

For those looking for political saviors

solace.

II,

He

age of Obama, Bacevich offers

asserted that our political leaders, especially our presidents since

have done

the crisis

in the

little

to quell the crisis

of profligacy;

by implementing a foreign policy

in fact,

little

World War

they have mostly aggravated

that has served to reinforce cxccptionalist

myths while gradually stretching the American military to the point of overextension.

One of the few

leaders

who

of Consumption,” was President

Bacevich’s claimed made a move against the “Empire

Jimmy

Carter. Carter's penalty for his honesty was to

have his ideas rejected out of hand while he was

in office;

who was more

of course, he was also defeated

for re-election

by Ronald Reagan,

exceptionalisl

myth by giving “the American people what they wanted.” Of course,

comfortable answers offered by most politicians

226

Ibid.,

62-66.
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than willing to cater to the

came

at

a price

-

a

the

growing national

debt, increased trade deficits,

name

foreign oil to

a few.

and an almost unshakable

reliance on (read: addiction to)

"" 7

These worsening conditions gradually

led the country to

its

present situation,

which Bacevich claimed was simply unsustainable. The attacks of September

by the Bush Administration have exacerbated

the response

brought everything to a head, but Bacevich

is

1

1

and

the multi-pronged crisis and

clear in his assertion that the entirety of the

blame cannot be cast upon George W. Bush and

his

Wise Men.

carrying out an extreme version of policies that have been

supported by leaders from both major political parties.

in

as they were simply

place for decades and

228

Nevertheless, Bacevich concluded that the exceptionalist assumptions which
the heart of

height of

least

its

our present

crisis

to

sound policy.” At the

power, Bacevich asserted, exceptionalism might have served

non-harmful role

In his

in

now “no

country could

American policy making. However, he

longer afford to indulge

in

a positive or at

boldly stated that the

such conceits.”"

29

conclusion, Bacevich followed up on his claim that the United States was

following a policy path that
prescription focused

discourse.

pose “an insurmountable obstacle

lie at

He

Ibid.,

29-43.

Ibid.,

58-63.

228

ultimately unsustainable for

much

longer.

upon the purging of exceptionalist myths from our

stated that

227

was

Americans must consciously discard

229

Ibid., 121.
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His

political

illusions such as the overly

simplistic global binary struggle between good and evil in which the United States plays

moment.

the guardian of righteousness juxtaposed against the perceived evil of the

Similarly, Baccvich claimed that Americans must recognize that “freedom,” particularly

as

it

has been defined

and philosophical

in

recent decades,

to the relentless pursuit of self-gratification.

Americans must abandon

the exceptionalist article of faith

the side of the United States and America

on a

hill

for the remainder of time.

As

simply not free; there

is

is

a cost, both material

Finally,

which posits

lie

asserted that

that history is

destined to serve as a permanent shining city

a replacement for the exceptionalist myth, Bacevich offers the doctrine

in

Niebuhrian terms. Enlightened realism

a complete rejection of the parochialism endemic

tempers self-absorption with the recognition
and non-state actors

is

on

- 0

“enlightened realism,” which he defines

state

is

that

the most effective

in

exceptionalist thought, rather

of
is

not

it

providing for the self-interest of other

means

to achieve one’s

own

self-

?3i

•

interest.

While he offered
lh

September

1

l

American

above

prescription as a possible cure for the

ills

of post-

America, Baccvich clearly believed that the likelihood of such a tectonic

shift in political thought

Rauchway:

the

was low. He

closed his

book with an assertion similar

exceptionalist myths, while clearly outdated, have a powerful hold

political psyche.

230
Ibid.,

171-176.

Ibid.,

174-175.

231

He

anticipated that the influence of exceptionalism

to

upon the

would be

unshakable and ultimately lead

American Empire.

to the “willful self-destruction”

of the, once great,

232

power

Bacevich's assessment of the ongoing and deepening crisis of American

brought to a head by the contemporary war on terrorism

absence of a significant consideration of class

and

Iraq drag

on without hope

its

own

into a

its

will

As

the

wars

its

is

around the world has appeared to

wide chasm.

a sense that history

Other empires

immune

set apart

is

on “our side” and ultimate victory

history wrongly held fast to the

in

to the factors that limit

no longer

exist

seems

from the

But

Afghanistan

corporate denizens) and

Most notably,

Clearly the expectations are impacted by exceptionalist myths.

there

in

disconnect between expectations

citizenry (including

the actual ability of the United States to project

grow

quite lucid, in spite of the

in his analysis.

for quick resolution, the

placed upon American power by

is

is

lost

power

in

is

same erroneous

“lesser” countries

- the

just

around the corner.

belief that they

fact that these

upon those smitten with the sense that America

is

were

empires

special and

rest.

the exceptionalist myth

United States. As revealed

in the

may be

all

that

Americans have

to cling to in the

previous chapters of this dissertation,

American

Exceptionalist thought has had a tremendous impact on political actors in this country;

from presidents

to average citizens, the

social, cultural,

economic and

232

Ibid.

political

myth of American uniqueness has impacted
behavior and the mores that perpetuate that

181-182.
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However, exceptionalism

behavior from one generation to the next.

tradition that

is

apparent

As revelatory

in

American

not the only

polity.

as Baccvich's conclusions arc to understanding our

remains

political crisis, lie

the

is

silent

on American

contemporary

political traditions, both positive

He cannot imagine

negative, that are non-exceptionalist in nature.

and

that a crisis of

any

proportion could shake the foundation of our exceptionalist myths, because he does not

appear to acknowledge the historic existence of any alternative political conceptions.

However, for almost as long as theorists and historians have been discussing
pervasive nature of

American Exceptionalism, other

across generations and, furthermore, they offer us

with the main tenets of

In the final

exceptionalism

is

1

will

American

it

American society and law

examples of principles

that contrast

I

will

examine an example of a non-

argue that this theory presents us with the possibility

not as pervasive

alternatives to exceptionalism

discourse, then

in

American Exceptionalism.

chapter of this dissertation,

exceptionalist theory.

social observers have discussed

These tendencies have appeared

alternative tendencies.

that

and impossible to overcome as many hypothesize.

have been historically noticeable

in the

American

If

political

might follow that such ideas could form the basis of a paradigm

political

the

shift in

thought as the dramatically changing conditions of our contemporary

world make American preeminence and

its

supporting exceptionalist myths

materially viable.

127

less

and

less

CHAPTER

6

CONCLUSIONS
My

goal in this concluding chapter

is

to introduce at least

one pattern of thought

dominant paradigm of American Exceptionalism.

that contrasted with the

My

hope

provide a convincing argument that the existence of alternative political traditions

is

to

in

United Stales history might indicate the possibility of the establishment of a nonexceptionalisl paradigm in the future.

American

Multiple Traditions in

The theory
Political

that

I

want

to

examine

in this

concluding chapter was developed by

Science professor Rogers Smith. Smith provided a vigorous challenge to the

canon of American Exceptionalism
Political Science Review.

in a

In that piece.

contribute to the development of

groundbreaking 1993

central to the

American

American Exceptionalist thought, particularly

inequality and inegalitarian structures throughout

the inequalities that

article in the

Smith suggested that the great theorists who

Tocqueville, Myrdal and Hartz, were too quick to dismiss

numerous examples of

American

history.

Smith asserted

American

'

political narrative.

that the liberal tradition

was, indeed, very influential

in

American

development, but he further stated that American politics was never as

superficially

that

were considered afterthoughts by the Exceptionalists were actually

Smith claimed
political

Politics

homogenous

as the Exceptionalist

Smith 1993, 536.

128

School had presumed

in their classic

Rather, Smith argued

wrilings.

and, above

all,

American

conflictual in nature.

'

2

political culture has been

4

Smith found multiple traditions present
birth of the

complex, inconsistent

in

American

political discourse since the

United States as an independent republic. Classical

liberal

and Madisonian

republican political ideals were certainly present in every generation, but Smith asserted

were also consistently justified through decidedly

that material inequalities

non-liberal

and anti-republican traditions. These traditions upheld discrimination and the existence
of permanent inequality

characteristics,

America by separating people based upon

in

such as race and gender.

Smith concluded
liberal tradition is

that, rather

insuperable

in

certain ascribed

2 '5

than unquestionably accepting the notion

American

politics, scholars of the

American

that the

political

system should responsibly “analyze America as the ongoing product of often conflicting
multiple traditions.”

theory into a

full

2 ''’

A

few years

later.

Smith would expand

length study of citizenship laws.

decidedly non-liberal tendencies that existed

tradition

who

-

the conflict over

who

234

558.

Ibid.,

549-550.

Ibid.,

563.

235

236

one aspect of the American

political

and who does not enjoy any formal

all.

Ibid.,

His book. Civic Ideals discussed the

gets to participate fully in the American political arena,

gets to participate only peripherally

participatory rights at

in

his “multiple traditions"

129

political

Smith asserted
level, a polity is

and

who

is

were

that citizenship laws

defined by

who

a telling

measure because,

possesses the opportunity to participate

denied that chance. Smith found that throughout American

at its

basic

in political life

history,

citizenship laws were crafted very illiberally and undemocralically; the frequent result

was

that large

groups of people were denied participatory

rights because of ascribed

characteristics such as race, ethnicity, gender and even religious practice."

Smith’s detection of a regular and repeated reliance upon ascribed
separate those

deemed worthy of citizenship and

trails to

those considered undeserving

important for our examination of American Exceptional ism for two reasons.
contradicts the notion that the United States

polity

by presenting a clear

set

is

the

home of a

of

political

myths such American Exceptionalism.
it

that political

myths

are, in

it

to the first point

American

some ways, necessary

successfully preside over a population, rulers must convince those over

propose to rule that they are a single and united body

politic.

myths worked exceptionally well as a means of achieving

helps to explain

The second point

appears counterintuitive

that variations to the exceptionalist predisposition exist in the

past.

in politics.

whom

Smith slated

the above goal.

myths, however, focus upon differences and therefore tend

^37

it

of decidedly non-liberal policies implemented consistently

requires further examination since initially

Smith claimed

First,

monolithic classical liberal

over the span of the entire history of the American Republic. Second,
the persistence

is

to unite a select

they

that ascriptive

Ascriptive

group of

•

Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship
History (New Haven: Yale, 1997), 1-2, 14 and 31.
130

To

in U.S.

people and anoint them as the “chosen ones” while separating

from the “other” who
way.

In the

is

portrayed as different usually

long term, such perspectives

facilitate the

in

this preferred

populace

some threatening and

sinister

establishment of rigid and lasting

social inequality with the privileged faction feeling justified in oppressing the out

group.

238

In the

case of American Exceptionalism, the myth

unmentioned but ubiquitous
for

liberal tradition.

genuine Americans. By implication,

is

That tradition

the tradition

is

the enduring legacy

is

of an

portrayed as a birthright

not something that

is

imbued

within the “other.”

Seemingly contrary

American Exceptionalism

to this “divisive liberalism” that is the

is

classical political liberalism.

philosophically broad-minded and cosmopolitan;

distinctness as a

means of bestowing

privilege

its

foundation of

Classical liberalism

is

adherents reject employing

upon some inhabitants of a polity while

marginalizing others.

I

suggest that the one means of reconciling the discrepancy between these two

definitions of liberalism

always been rooted
Ideals.

Of course,

grounded

to

recognize that the ideology of American Exceptionalism has

in the ascriptive tradition that

Smith discussed

at

length in Civic

the language surrounding exceptionalism has, without fail,

in the tradition

Ibid.,

is

of classical liberalism.

6-9 and 31-34.
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remained

Constructing a

Smith's argument

in

New American

Narrative

Civic Ideals represents a profound contribution to the

deconstruction of American Exceptional ism. During the course of his study, Smith
ascertained that the preferences of elites have historically

The preeminence of these

discourse.

dominated American

political

preferences has been sustained by a variety of

elite

myths. The most often used and the most consistently effective myths are those that seek
to divide

Americans based upon ascriptive

In the

America

traits.

conclusion of his book. Smith attempted to lay the foundation for a

narrative

- one

that

is

truly liberal (in the

new

cosmopolitan sense) and rejects

ascriptive myths. Smith suggested that national political identities should be crafted and

maintained

in

manner

a

similar to the time-tested processes

used to generate loyalty to

political parties in pluralist democracies."

Smith claimed

that the party

allow for the consideration of the

that studies

model would be effective but flexible enough

many complexities of human

social relations.

of political party identification often found that party loyalty

is

in

them from

In spite

of

this,

their youth.

party

Ibid.,

membership

is still

Ibid., pp.

was

widely acknowledged as a product of

cannot reasonable expect that appeals to blind

491.

240

stated

240

free choice. Therefore, party leaders

239

He

powerful and

relatively permanent, with few people ultimately rejecting a party affiliation that

ingrained

to

492-494.

132

loyally will

keep

all

members

-

belonging

process

when

into without insulting

baggage of mysticism

mechanism

to construct a

necessary, while at the

that

would provide

same time making room

a

means

for uniting

for a truly insightful

which people voluntarily and reflexively develop a feeling of belonging

in

something
attractive

buy

241

Smith attempted
the polity

create and maintain

provide a framework that gives people a strong sense of authentic

a belonging that they can

and binary absolutes.

that construction of a

would force those who

national political identity along these lines

identity narratives to

Smith asserted

in the fold forever.

that is higher, nobler

and compelling but

I

and more timeless than them. His argument

question whether

it

can prevail

in

is

to

both

post-September

lh
1

l

America.

As Smith explained,

elites are often

responsible for the construction and

maintenance of political myths. They craft myths that convince a subject population
they are, indeed, a singular civil

polity that a particular set

body

politic

that

and then further convince the now united

of elites represents the ideal choice for leadership. The

elites,

themselves, are hardly disassociated puppet masters. Rather, Smith pointed out that they

often rank

among

the truest believers

of their

own mythology.

Needless to say, political myth-making
narratives are certainly not

241

something

Ibid.,

494-497.

Ibid.,

6 and 32-34.

242

is

242

an immense undertaking; guiding

that societies establish or

133

change on a whim. Once

a narrative has

is

been constructed, deconstructing

a herculean social task;

one

that surely

it

would

and fashioning

not be

a

new dominant myth

assumed unless

there

was

a crisis

of legitimacy facing the silting political leadership.

We

are likely to find either a

group of elites re-fashioning

position or a group of challengers attempting to

adhere to a

crisis,

is

it

new

not reasonable to

a bold

move

ascriptive differences

ever expect to find a

that the

to maintain their

assume power by convincing

assume

that a non-ascriptive

the polity to

myth would be constructed and

243

to re-fashion or replace a guiding

outside of a crisis situation and crisis situations are ideal

and promoted

myth

narrative at a time of crisis. Given the likely existence of profound

promoted under either of these circumstances.
If

a

myth

is

unlikely to be proposed

moments

for

and simplistic binary relationships of good and

window of opportunity

to the public at-large?

myths

that rely

evil, then

can

on

we

for a non-ascriptive narrative to be forged

While such

a prospect

seems

unlikely,

it

is

apparent

people of the United Stales are facing a time for sober reflection and reevaluation

of our collectively preconceived notions.
Less than a generation ago,

academic circles

it

was fashionable within both

to consider the possibility that

an American century (or perhaps, millennium).

llight

intellectual and non-

world history was about

Now,

it

is

difficult to

to

embark upon

imagine

that

such a

of the imagination could have been considered possible by serious minded people.

Ibid.,

502. Even Smith acknowledged that ascriptive myths tend

during times of crisis.

134

to

dominate

Rather,

it

is

becoming

painfully obvious for even the strictest adherent to the

exceptionalist ideal that the United States

is

no longer the sole arbiter

its

own

national

alone the driver of history for the entire global village.

fate, let

In his

post-September

lh
I

book,

l

Who Are We?, Samuel Huntington suggested

and substance” of American

that the “salience

shaped by America's new vulnerability

identity

was

to external attack.”

“being

at least partially

244

In

response, Huntington

become

offered the argument that maintaining the foundational American Creed will

more, not

less,

vulnerability.

imperative as Americans adjust to their newly discovered feelings of
Here, Huntington allows himself to become trapped between his

acceptance that “a creed alone does not a nation make” and his strong sense

American Creed
together.

is

the only valuable thing holding the fabric of

that the

American society

245

The

attacks of September

1

1,

2001

may have exposed something more than

vulnerability in the strategic defenses of the United States; they might have uncovered a

latent fear that the

past.

Huntington

American century

lie

reflects a similar pessimistic fatalism in the first chapter

We? He

asserts that “(n)o society

America

will suffer the fate of Sparta,

244

Identity

Huntington, Samuel

(New

P.

is

immortal

Rome

In the

Ibid.,

of

Who Are We?: The

337.

Ibid., 11-12.

135

Who

are

end, the United States of

and other human communities.”

York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), 336.

245

246

not ahead of us in the future, but behind us in the

246

Challenges to America's National

While Huntington’s
decline of the United Slates

prediction will surely

is

not inevitable nor

narrative like the exceptionalist myth.

In

come

is

it

to pass eventually, the

solely dependent

contrast to Huntington,

I

upon

immediate

a single

believe that embracing

multiple identities might be a source of great intellectual strength for Americans.

Moreover,

it

major power

The

may

be the only alternative that allows the United States to continue as a

(likely

among

several others).

exceptionalist myth can no longer provide

seek concerning their domestic
ability of

Americans

political relationships.

Americans with the answers they
Furthermore,

to craft meaningful connections with “others”

Now may

be the time for a new and more comprehensive narrative.

American

polity

is

up

to the task, but

humankind moves forward
and

likely

more and more

1

am

quite sure that

into a century that will

conflictual identities.

136

it

is

it

likely hinders the

around the globe.

I

am

unsure

if

the

a necessary venture as

be marked by more and

more complex
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